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The Berbice River Bridge: Subsidy, reversion and the politics of arithmetic
Business & Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram
During the Committee of Supply stage of the 2026 Budget, Bishop Juan Edghill, Minister of Public Works, announced that Government is finalising negotiations to purchase the Berbice River Bridge and suggested that the acquisition will cost less than the projected toll subsidies between now and next year. That comparison may sound fiscally attractive. It is not the comparison that determines legality or prudence.
The more perplexing question is this: why is the State proposing to buy an asset that it is already scheduled to own? The concession granted to Berbice Bridge Company Inc. under the Berbice River Bridge Act expires in June 2027. It does not create a permanent private ownership that ends only with a buyout. Section 7(1)(a) provides that upon expiry of the Concession period, all of the Concessionaire’s right, title and interest in and to the Bridge revert to the Minister. The statutory architecture is clear – concession for a defined term, followed by mandatory reversion.
The Minister responsible for Public Works is the authority named in the Act to enter into and regulate the Concession. The legal position is therefore fixed by statute and administered by the very office now asserting a negotiated acquisition. Frankly, there is no apparent justification or benefit.
There are certain basic propositions which, I trust, are not in dispute. The Concession Agreement remains in force. It has not been terminated or abrogated. While the Coalition subsidised certain tolls, the PPP/C removed tolls in August 2025, compensating the Bridge Company with full payment for vehicles crossing the Bridge. The only change was the source of payment: motorists ceased paying tolls; taxpayers replaced that revenue stream.
Under the concession arrangement, the company is not entitled to keep every dollar generated by traffic. Toll revenue must first meet operating and maintenance costs and service the project debt. Only the agreed return constitutes its entitlement. In addition, the Concession requires the Bridge to be handed back in good condition at expiry. The obligation to maintain the asset until 2027 rests with the Concessionaire. It is not a deferred cost to the State.
Between now and 2027, therefore, the company’s entitlement is limited to its operating costs, debt servicing and its contractually defined return, net of its continuing maintenance obligations. When the Concession ends, no private right survives beyond that date.
The first analytical question is unavoidable: has the subsidy exceeded that net surplus? If it has not, taxpayers have merely replaced motorists as the payer. If it has, then public funds are enlarging the company’s economic position beyond what the Concession permits before expiry.
The second question concerns the proposed acquisition. The State will receive the Bridge in 2027. The only economic value to the Company remaining in 2026 is the limited net entitlement between now and expiry. Any purchase price must therefore correspond to that residual value. Payment beyond it is not payment for a continuing right; it is compensation for rights that terminate by law.
It is difficult to reconcile the Minister’s public explanation with this statutory framework. The explanation offered is inconsistent with both the Act and the Concession Agreement. If the Minister’s position is otherwise, he must now state it by reference to those documents.
Further concerns arise because oversight from the Ministry of Finance and the Audit Office has been conspicuously muted in relation to this project, despite the magnitude of the public funds involved. The subsidy has been significant. The proposed acquisition will also be significant. Yet there has been no public reconciliation of those payments against the Concessionaire’s remaining lawful entitlement before reversion.
Adding to public concerns is the company’s apparent discomfort with scrutiny. Over the years, efforts to examine its corporate filings were met with resistance and, at times, prohibitive charges, including a demand in the region of $50,000 for access to a single page of a corporate document. Engagements at the Registry of Companies did not always reflect the transparency contemplated under company law. These matters form part of the governance history against which the present proposal must be assessed.
Corporate governance is not cosmetic. When private interest and public resources meet, when public infrastructure is financed under a private concession, governance is not a choice: it is a precondition. The Concessionaire includes significant private shareholders. Given the well-known proximity between senior political actors and a principal financier of the Bridge, the absence of transparent arithmetic only heightens the need for full disclosure, and triggers suspicion. In such circumstances, precision is not optional; it is essential.
The Minister in this matter is not merely a political negotiator. He is the statutory custodian of the Concession. His authority derives from the Act. His powers are bound by it. His duty is fiduciary and it runs to the people of Guyana – not to political relationships, not to commercial familiarity and not to past allegiance.
Section 38 of the Agreement requires that certain steps should already have begun. It binds the Minister, the Government and importantly, the company. Any attempt to circumvent those will be unlawful, an abuse of public office and a breach of the minister’s duty.
He needs to change direction and do the right thing. Legally, he has no choice.
The law allows publication of the helicopter crash report subject only to such limited and necessary redaction to protect legitimate national security interests
Dear Editor,
During the 2026 Budget debate in the National Assembly last week, Minister Deodat Indar stated that the report into the December 2023 Guyana Defence Force helicopter crash would not be released to the public, on the basis that the aircraft was engaged in a military operation. That assertion raises a discrete legal question: whether, as a matter of international aviation law or Guyana’s domestic law, the Minister’s position is legally justified.
The analysis therefore turns on the legal consequences of that characterisation. It requires consideration of the international framework governing state aircraft, particularly the Chicago Convention, and of the domestic legal regime governing access to official information, including the Constitution of Guyana and the Access to Information Act 2011. The central issue is whether either body of law supports the Minister’s conclusion that the report may not be disclosed.
Internationally, the Chicago Convention distinguishes between civilian aircraft and aircraft engaged in military service. Aircraft in military service are excluded from the Convention’s mandatory civil aviation accident-reporting regime. That exclusion, however, goes to obligation only. It does not prohibit disclosure, nor does it regulate access to information under domestic law.
The constitutional position is governed by Article 146 of the Constitution of Guyana, which protects freedom of expression and includes the freedom to receive information without interference. While that right may be limited in the interests of defence or public safety, any restriction must be reasonably required and capable of justification.
The Access to Information Act 2011 gives effect to that constitutional right. It recognises national security and military operations as grounds for exemption, but it does so on a qualified basis. The Act contemplates redaction and partial disclosure where necessary, not the blanket suppression of an entire report.
Five servicemen lost their lives in the December 2023 crash. Their families continue to seek closure. The helicopter bore civil aviation registration and was not engaged in combat. These factors engage a strong public interest in disclosure of the non-operational findings of the investigation.
A previous Senior Minister publicly committed to the release of the report. If the present position is that disclosure is now unlawful, that proposition must be established in law. Ministerial succession does not alter the legal obligations of the State.
The question is not whether sensitive military information may be protected, but whether the law permits the suppression of an entire investigation report; neither the Chicago Convention nor the Access to Information Act appears to support the Minister’s conclusion.
In my considered opinion, the law allows publication of the report, subject only to such limited and strictly necessary redaction as is required to protect legitimate national security interests. The public interest overwhelmingly favours disclosure.
Sincerely,
Christopher Ram
Business & Economic Commentary by Christopher Ram
Mr. Deodat Sharma, Auditor General, is reported to have applied for a two-year extension of his tenure. It will be recalled that Mr. Sharma was confirmed many years ago in circumstances best described as accidental, following the absence of an AFC member from the Public Accounts Committee on the day of confirmation. It should also be recalled that the office of Auditor General carries the same constitutional status and security of tenure as the Chancellor of the Judiciary and the Chief Justice.
Approval and any extensions rest with the Executive President. At the same time, President Irfaan Ali has retained the portfolio of Finance and is therefore constitutionally the Minister of Finance, with Dr. Ashni Singh serving as Senior Minister with responsibility for finance within the Office of the President. It is difficult to find a word that adequately captures this anomaly without offending editorial modesty.
The appointment of the Auditor General is made formally on the advice of the Public Service Commission. That safeguard is illusory. The Commission itself is appointed by, and remains effectively controlled by, the President and is chaired by a close associate of the governing party. This executive-centred circularity, embedded in the 1980 Constitution, is not treated by the ruling party as a flaw but exploited as a feature.
Such a framework is structurally incapable of producing independence. What-ever autonomy exists must come entirely from the personal courage, professional standing and institutional assertiveness of the individual appointed. When those qualities are absent – or discouraged – the office becomes an extension of executive convenience rather than a check upon it. It is in that context that the present request for an extension must be understood: not as a question of continuity, but as a measure of how thoroughly independence has been eroded.
Mr. Sharma is not a professionally qualified accountant and does not meet the statutory requirements ordinarily associated with the office. More troubling than qualification, however, is performance. During a period marked by explosive growth in public expenditure running into tens of billions of dollars, the proliferation of discretionary funds and persistently weak financial systems, the Auditor General has shown zero appetite to challenge, interrogate or even issue timely and meaningful warnings.
A review of the 2020 – 2025 Estimates under the Ali Administration shows an annual expansion of discretionary payments. In addition to the 40-hour part-time employment programme, cost-of-living buffers, community policing stipends and contract employment arrangements, Budget 2026 introduces yet another discretionary initiative, the house repairs programme.
Each of these programmes demands extensive systems audits, rigorous beneficiary verification, reconciliation testing and post-payment forensic review. None has received that level of scrutiny. Taken together, they signal a decisive shift away from rules-based public finance contemplated by the Fiscal Management and Accountability Act toward political control of public funds, with the Auditor General content to observe rather than object.
At the same time, Dr. Singh, as de facto Minister of Finance, has failed to modernise or implement systems capable of tracking, controlling and reporting such spending. This is precisely the environment in which an Auditor General should be demanding additional resources, specialist staff and forensic capacity. Instead, the response has been institutional quiet. Reports are produced on schedule, photographs are taken and deadlines are met – but audit quality, thematic analysis and systemic challenge are absent.
The handling of the Auditor General’s Report for 2024 illustrates the point. It was presented around 30 September 2025 with ceremony. Less than two months later, an “updated” report was delivered on a flash drive, without errata, reconciliation or explanation. This is unprofessional and grave. At best, it signals form over substance; at worst, it raises questions too serious to ignore.
More serious still is what has not been done. Despite clear statutory requirements, the Auditor General has failed year after year to conduct and present annual audits of tax concessions granted under the Income Tax (In Aid of Industry) Act. Billions of dollars in foregone revenue remain effectively unaudited. This is not a marginal omission; it goes to the heart of fiscal accountability and ministerial responsibility.
Parliamentary oversight has fared no better. The Government has made a mockery of the work of the Public Accounts Committee by cynically adjusting quorum requirements and repeatedly failing to attend scheduled meetings. Meetings were cancelled not occasionally but serially – some three, four, even five times in succession, including the 54th Meeting in 2023 and the 68th Meeting in 2024. The result is unprecedented: none of the audit years from 2020 to 2024 has been examined. The Committee’s last Chairman left office publicly regretting that the PAC was unable to discharge its constitutional function for a single year of the Ali Administration. An Auditor General serious about accountability would have raised alarm. Mr. Sharma did not.
What makes the present situation especially corrosive is that fiscal power and audit influence now sit within the same household. The de facto Minister of Finance presides over unprecedented discretionary spending, while his spouse exercises effective authority within the Audit Office as the de facto Auditor General. That arrangement is incompatible with any serious conception of independence. It would be unacceptable if formalised; it is scarcely less objectionable because it is informal.
The Constitution does not contemplate that the power to spend and the power to audit would be consolidated so intimately, nor that the country would be asked to pretend that this is normal.
It now appears that Mr. Sharma’s request for an extension will be granted by default, not on merit, because of a total absence of succession planning. The alternative would be the formal appointment of the current de facto Auditor General, who is also the spouse of the de facto Minister of Finance.
That situation is only marginally better than formal appointment. Whether the conflict is acknowledged or merely tolerated makes little difference in substance. In either case, audit authority would be exercised by a person whose proximity to the centre of fiscal power fatally compromises independence. The distinction between de facto and de jure becomes one of optics rather than principle.
This is not a justification for extension. It is an admission of deliberate, inexcusable and unacceptable governance failure. Succession planning in a constitutional office is not optional; it is a duty. Its neglect has produced a false and manufactured choice: retain an Auditor General who has failed to assert the office in the public interest, or formalise an arrangement that would extinguish even the appearance of audit independence.
Neither option is acceptable.
Force majeure, shareholder messaging and a history of accommodation (Part II)
Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 175
Introduction
Today’s column concludes a two-part piece arising from comments made by ExxonMobil’s Chief Executive Officer during the company’s fourth-quarter earnings call. When Darren Woods spoke of force majeure “pausing the clock,” he was addressing shareholders and the wider investment community, not the Government of Guyana, a regulator, or an arbitral tribunal.
That context matters. In describing Guyana’s offshore acreage as something Exxon can count on “in the short term and in the longer term,” Woods was signaling future opportunity and growth. Guyana’s petroleum resources were being presented as deferred value — assets temporarily unavailable but nonetheless expected to be realised. In practical terms, Guyana’s natural resources were being used to support ExxonMobil’s forward-looking narrative to American and international shareholders.
What makes that possible is not bravado. It is experience.
Poor history
Guyana’s past treatment of force majeure has been notably permissive. On previous occasions, force majeure has been accepted by the Guyana authorities under expansive and accommodating conditions, with little public explanation and no visible demonstration of strict scrutiny. The practical effect has been repeated extensions of time, prolonged retention of acreage, and the suspension of contractual obligations without a corresponding showing that performance was genuinely prevented.
Over time, that practice shapes expectations. When force majeure is treated as something that can be obtained by request rather than established by proof, it ceases to be exceptional. It becomes routine. Contractors learn that delay carries limited cost and that contractual clocks can be paused with minimal resistance. In such an environment, it is hardly surprising that force majeure is spoken of as an advantage rather than an excuse.
But as we said last week, force majeure is not self-proving, and it is not unilateral. The determination lies with the Government of Guyana, subject to the dispute-resolution and arbitration mechanisms provided for in the Agreement. Where that determination is approached loosely or informally, the legal balance of the contract shifts from the Government.
But Woods is clever. He knows that statements made on international earnings calls shape analyst reports, investor expectations, and perceptions of future reserves. When Guyana’s petroleum acreage is publicly framed as future opportunity awaiting activation, it implicitly assumes State acquiescence. Silence or passivity by the Government in such circumstances risks being interpreted as confirmation.
Government must act
This is why the Government should not treat force majeure as a purely technical footnote. Once it is publicly invoked in a manner that carries market implications, the Government has a duty to engage. Engagement does not require confrontation, but it does require clarity: clarity that force majeure is not automatic; clarity that it is not indefinite; and clarity that it does not confer a future option over national resources.
That duty to engage is heightened by the Government’s own repeated reliance on sanctity of contract as the reason for refusing renegotiation of the 2016 Agreement. That principle cannot operate selectively. If the Agreement is to be respected, it must be enforced in full – including the limits it places on force majeure. Liberal accommodation today undermines contractual discipline tomorrow.
It also weakens Guyana’s position over time. Each unexamined extension – or non-relinquishment or partial relinquishment – becomes precedent in practice, even if not in law. Each accommodation reinforces the perception that even simply asking is more than sufficient. That perception, once entrenched, is difficult to reverse.
None of this is to deny that force majeure may arise in genuine cases. It can. But the history of permissive application explains why force majeure is now spoken of as a benefit to be managed rather than a disruption to be overcome. That is not where Guyana’s petroleum governance should be.
Conclusion
This issue now sits squarely with Cabinet. Continued silence or routine accommodation is no longer neutral; it carries legal and governance consequences. Once force majeure is asserted, the Government’s response becomes an administrative decision affecting public resources and is therefore subject to scrutiny. A history of permissive treatment does not protect such decisions; it weakens them. Cabinet cannot credibly invoke sanctity of contract while allowing force majeure to function as a default extension mechanism.
The choice is between reasserting contractual discipline now, or defending it later under judicial review.
Speaker’s interruption of Nandranie Singh was out of order
Dear Editor,
In the course of her presentation on the 2026 Budget as shadow Minister of Labour, WIN’s Ms. Nandranie Singh was interrupted by the Speaker, who purported to correct her. Ms. Singh had pointed out that the largest item shown under the Ministry of Labour was not expenditure controlled by the Ministry but a subvention to the Board of Industrial Training. The interruption was out of order. It is not the Speaker’s role to rebut a member’s argument; that responsibility lies with the Government benches whose estimates are under scrutiny. By intervening in this manner, the Speaker crossed from presiding over debate into participating in it.
The intervention was also ill-informed. Mr. Nadir previously served as Minister of Labour and ought therefore to know that the Board of Industrial Training is a creature of statute (Industrial Training Act Cap. 39:04), not a department of the Ministry. And that a subvention does not make its expenditure ministerial spending.
If Mr. Nadir’s tenure as Minister blurred those distinctions, it is not too late for him, as Speaker, to respect them.
Yours faithfully,
Christopher Ram