Category: Private sector

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Guyana hosts regional accounting conference

Introduction
Guyanese accountants are this weekend hosting their counterparts from the region in the annual conference of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of the Caribbean (ICAC). This is the region’s umbrella body bringing together accountants of the English-speaking Caribbean. According to the ICAC website its membership is currently made up of seven members and four affiliates. The members are the national institutes of the territories of the region each of which operates under domestic statute.

The conference comes at another of those times when circumstances force the profession and/or the state to confront issues affecting the public interest. Sometimes the profession is affected indirectly rather than directly. One such example was in 1862 when the UK Parliament quickly reversed the 1856 Companies Act which had all but abandoned the mandatory accounting and auditing requirements of the 1844 Companies Act, encouraging a form of laissez-faire accountability. But the most dramatic and direct example of reform within recent memory was the Enron debacle which was quickly followed by a series of corporate failures forcing the US to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Failure was not restricted to the companies involved, but affected one of the pillars of the auditing profession – the prestigious Arthur Andersen which gave up its licences after being found guilty of criminal charges relating to the firm’s handling of the audit of Enron. The firm won something of a Pyrrhic victory when the Supreme Court of the United States overturned the verdict, but by then the firm’s demise had been sealed.

Blurring profit and professionalism
Only a few years preceding the Enron failure, Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission of the US had said of the profession: “The audit profession has a long and distinguished history of guarding the integrity of our companies’ financial statements. They must live up to their history… I fear that the audit process, long rooted in independence and professionalism, may be diminished in the name of these increasingly lucrative and commercial opportunities.”

In other words accounting and auditing had become a business and the profession was in danger of individual accountants and firms putting profit and personal interest before the profession. The challenge for the society and the profession is how to balance the pursuit for profits with the objectives of the profession to set and maintain the highest standards of professionalism, to attain the highest levels of performance and generally to ensure that the public is convinced that the hallmark of the profession – independence and integrity – remains intact.

A market economy requires that there be credibility in information and information systems that are fed to shareholders and the public. And that persons who are certified by the accounting bodies to offer professional accounting and auditing services possess the highest standards of technical competence, experience and expertise and performance. Such issues must be ever present in the minds of those with responsibility for the proper functioning of our society.

Top of the chain
The region’s laws give to the accounting profession major and valuable roles to perform in the proper functioning of the economies of the countries. In Guyana these include the Companies Act, which assigns to the accounting profession the power to set and oversee the application of accounting standards and invests it with the sole authority to carry out the audits of locally incorporated or external companies registered to carry on business in Guyana. The Corporation Tax Act requires all companies to support their tax returns with financial statements audited by members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Guyana. The Securities Industry Act and the Financial Institutions Act all assign or delegate to the profession specific roles with regard to compliance with internal controls.

Under the principles of corporate governance the accounting profession in the role of internal auditors is regarded as one of the pillars of sound corporate governance, and in many jurisdictions the Audit Committee is one of the standing committees of the board with defined powers, rights, obligations and reporting responsibilities.

Increasingly too, accountants because of their facility with figures have risen up the corporate ladder and many of the region’s CEOs are either accountants or are MBAs majoring in finance or accounting. By law they sit at the top of the accounting pyramid. In practice they can be both the players and scorers adding to the challenge of meaningful regulation. Those are immense privileges that are sadly not always matched by commensurate responsibilities.

Making accountants more accountable
Enron and its ‘side-kicks,’ Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems and WorldCom may have been perceived by the regional profession as a US problem, and it seems that the region saw itself as a witness to a fascinating spectacle, but no more. Now, faced with Stanford and Clico is the profession in the region right to ignore the possibility that these major disasters which continue to have ripple-down effects on households are as much governance and regulatory failures as they are accounting failures? Hopefully the accountants meeting at the Conference Centre would find time to address this critical issue.

The US tried its best in the face of resistance from the profession to make the profession more accountable, and following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, self-regulated peer reviews at accounting firms were replaced by independent inspections conducted by the Public Company Accounting and Oversight Board. But that applies only to the US.

Here in the Caribbean, characterised by the smallness of our economies and countries and the nature and size of business units, it is no surprise that the accounting profession is dominated by sole practitioners or partnerships of no more than a handful of persons. There is limited scope for second reviews, peer reviews and quality control or in-house capability to deal with complex technical or ethical issues. And with only four major accounting firms in the world – down from eight a couple of decades ago – real choice even for the big companies is seriously limited for purchasers of audit services. Yet self-regulation is regarded as sacrosanct.

All national legislation provides for a self-regulated profession in which the accountants make or adopt their own technical, professional and ethical rules and oversee and discipline – or fail to discipline – individual members and firms where their conduct has brought the accounting profession into disrepute. It is perhaps no surprise then that one of the objectives of the ICAC is the preservation of the self-regulatory nature of the profession. The profession forgets at its peril that in many cases the failures surface soon after the auditors for those companies have given them a clean bill of health.

Education
It would seem that the Caribbean Institute has abandoned one of its founding objectives, and that is the creation of a standard regional accounting examination, administered initially by one of the international accounting bodies. At the time that decision was taken there was considerably greater disparity in corporate and tax legislation and relevant textbooks were unavailable. Such restrictions have been reduced.

There has been much by way of reform if not harmonization in corporate law and our countries, with the exception of The Bahamas are all signatories to what is popularly referred to as the Caricom Double Taxation Treaty. There is now an excellent text by Dr Claude Denbow on taxation in the Commonwealth, and the region’s law schools have a considerable amount of material on corporate law.

As new legislation is enacted in the region to give effect to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, as the profession is held to be part of the fight against money-laundering, and as our professionals if not our artisans move freely around the Caribbean, the dream of a Caribbean professional accounting qualification that begins with a degree programme from our regional universities should be revived.

The region’s lawyers and doctors have done it. There seems no reason for accountants to hold on to the coat-tails of international accounting bodies principally from the UK to shape our accounting education in the second decade of the 21st century.

Ethics and insurance
Accountants have a duty not only to act ethically, but also competently. Shareholders, investors, tax authorities and other users of the financial statements rely heavily on the yearly financial statements of a company, as they can use this information to make informed decisions about investment and taxation – two issues of major public importance.

The journals of the major accounting bodies reflect an alarming increase in the number of complaints lodged against accountants and auditors. That must be a fraction of the actual incidence of this phenomenon. The public is largely unaware of the finer points of professional ethics, and accountants are loathe to report on their colleagues since they may be as equally culpable. And even if a complaint is lodged, the rules for addressing it are too often unclear and allow for such complaint to be heard only by accountants.

The danger is that self-investigation can become self-protection.
Finally our accountants ought to place on their agenda another problem facing the public in the region, and that is that the bulk of the professional accounting practitioners have no professional indemnity insurance. The regional or national bodies do not require it and the insurance industry is hesitant to offer it. So the client who receives sub-standard advice or shoddy work from his accountant is often left with practically no recourse but to end the relationship. That is no remedy.

Hopefully even as the Caribbean accountants enjoy Guyana’s hospitality and grapple with arcane concepts of IFRSs, the financial crisis and modernising corporate legislation, they will reflect on their overriding duty to the public and the need to restore public confidence in the profession.

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Weaknesses in the self-regulation of the accounting industry have been demonstrated

The acceptance by Mr Chandradat Chintamani, FCCA of a place on the board of Demerara Distillers Limited on the last day of 2008 has highlighted the role of individual accountants and the regulator in ensuring that ethical standards in the accounting profession are maintained.

Mr Chintamani is a member of the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Guyana (ICAG) and the Secretary and point man of its Investigations Committee. That committee took close to five years (April 22, 2004 to December 30, 2008) to adjudicate on a professional complaint against two senior directors of DDL and the company’s auditors over a loan-buy back from troubled Hamilton Bank. The evidence is that the company gained from the transaction US$1.1M or more than G$200M at the then exchange rate of the US to the Guyana dollar. The gist of the complaint was that DDL had failed to account for the gain in its financial statements on which the auditors gave a clean opinion.

As the complainant I provided Mr Chintamani directly with particulars of the buy-back which were not reflected in the company’s financial statements.

What increased the concern over the transaction were the conflicting statements made by two senior officials of the company and their inconsistency with the information provided to Mr Chintamani.

In a letter dated December 1, 2003 the company’s Chairman had stated that “the loan was treated as a creditor and included in current liabilities since it is a line of credit.” For good measure the Chairman added that the net effect of the settlement resulted in no gain or loss to the company.

Two weeks later on December 14, 2003 a different story emerged from an article in the Stabroek News in which then Finance Controller and now General Manager of the company Mr Loris Nathoo reported that “since the transaction happened within the financial year and the loans were short-term the company did not see it necessary to report the matter in its statement” (sic). He was also reported as saying that the 25% discount of US$1.1M reflected “interest and other charges.”

After some considerable silence on the part of the Investigations Committee I received a letter dated December 30, 2008 advising me that “based on documentation examined, the Council [of the ICAG] is convinced that the settlement of the loan with Hamilton Bank Limited was properly accounted for in the financial statements of DDL for the year ended December 31, 2002.” I was therefore confronted with a number of questions:

If according to the company’s Chairman the loan was treated as a creditor (as opposed to loans payable or separate treatment as it is an interest bearing liability) how could the Investigations Committee find that it was properly accounted for?

If the later statement by the Finance Controller is correct and there was no need to report the matter in its financial statements were the Finance Controller and the ICAG referring to two different sets of statements?

Assuming that the ICAG is correct, why did interest payable only increase by $72M from 2002 to 2003 if in fact a gain was set against interest payable in 2002?

Should there not have been a disclosure of a loan transaction involving US$4.673M including the credit being specifically disclosed in note 4 to the financial statements?

Since under the ICAG’s bye-laws the Institute can initiate an investigation without a complaint, what is the burden and standard of proof applied by the Investigations Committee and its own obligations to pursue evidence in relation to any enquiry it carries out?

To resolve these questions I wrote the Secretary of the ICAG on January 19, 2009 asking for a copy of the report done by the Investigations Committee. I have not had a response to my request but learnt unofficially that the report may have been oral which raises some serious questions indeed.

The role of the ICAG as regulator is not only to advance the interest of its members generally but also to ensure the maintenance of high standards of practice and professional conduct by all its members. Vernon Soare, ICAEW Executive Director of Professional Standards on the occasion of the decision of that body to open up its tribunals to the press and the public in 2007 put it this way: “A modern professional body must demonstrate that its processes are objective and in the public interest.”

The conduct of the Investigations Committee and the ICAG in the matter of the complaint against DDL and its auditors clearly did not meet that test but rather demonstrated the serious weaknesses in self-regulation and the failure of the accounting profession in its duty to the public. The reputation of the country is no less determined by the conduct of its politicians than by the integrity of the accounting profession.

From the sequence of events Mr Chintamani must have been engaged in discussions about a seat on DDL’s board even while he bore a duty to participate in an independent investigation into a complaint against leading members of that Board. At a minimum, Mr Chintamani should have disclosed to the Council of the ICAG his impending appointment and the Board of DDL ought to have considered the ethical issue involved in offering a place to Mr Chintamani. The approach to him was improper and distasteful and does a disservice to the entire Board of DDL but in the final analysis it was Mr Chintamani’s duty to refuse. His failure to do so, undermined the investigation and discredits the profession.

Mr Chintamani needs to reconsider his decision and lapse of judgment and do what is necessary to restore some measure of confidence in the profession. The Council of the ICAG must also consider whether in the light of these developments the findings of the Investigations Committee can and should stand. A profession that many see, perhaps unfairly, as part of the tax evasion industry cannot afford to feed any negative perceptions about its leading members and itself.

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On the Line: New Building Society Limited Annual Report 2008

– $200M exchange loss

Introduction
Forgive the rather misleading heading which is the standard for the review of annual reports in this column. It is misleading because at the time of writing the annual report of the Society, including the report of the directors and the financial statements, has not yet been made available to its members. Compelled by its own law that the AGM must be held before April 30, the directors have chosen for the venue of the meeting the Cotton Tree Primary School, West Coast, Berbice on Saturday April 25 with the first item on the agenda “to receive the financial statements and the Reports of the Directors for 2008.”
The financial statements of the Society audited by long serving and proposed-to-be-replaced Jack A Alli, Sons and Company show growth in deposits by just over 5% from $28.9B to $30.5B. This is the smallest percentage increase in deposits since 2002 and represents a recent trend of declining annual percentage increases. More significantly, however, is the decline of more than $103M in profits for the year. This is the second successive decline but is the highest decline recorded by the Society in recent history. Readers will recall that the 2007 profits were charged with the sum of $74M resulting from the fraud on an account holder.

It really has not been two good years for the Society under new Chairman Dr Nanda Gopaul, who signed the 2008 financial statements along with Mr Floyd McDonald, Deputy Chairman and former Commissioner of Police now on contract with the government, and Mr A Khan, Director/Secretary.

Commentary
The major reason for the decline in 2008 is an exchange loss of $200M, arising almost entirely on UK Government Treasury Bills which are denominated in pounds sterling, the exchange rate of which declined to the Guyana dollar by more than 20% between December 31, 2007 and December 31, 2008. While the Society had an exchange gain of $67M in 2007 it may be time for the directors to consider whether in the light of the volatility of international currencies it should liquidate those investments and repatriate the proceeds or invest in a currency to which the Guyana dollar is more aligned.

Loan assets have increased by 12.1 % from $16.99B to $19.1B almost a third more than GBTI, the performance of which was reviewed in a guest column last week and which has deposits of considerably more than the NBS. NBS, a creature of legislation, is restricted to how much it may lend and the nature of the security it has to have. On the other hand its income is tax-exempt and it can afford to and does pay the highest rates of interest on deposit accounts and charges the lowest rates on lending.

Despite the fall in income, reserves have increased from $4.5B to $4.79B or 6.4%. The Society is cash strong with some $4.2B in cash resources, almost all being held in interest-bearing fixed deposits. As discussed later in this column, that position would change significantly in 2009. The average interest earned on those resources was 5.6% compared with 4.2% earned in 2007. Investments which with the exception of the bridge bonds are liquid, amount to $11.3B, down from $13.55B. They earned an average return of 4.3% in 2008 compared with 4.5% in 2007.

Governance, the bridge and Clico
Perhaps the most controversial issue arising out of the financial statements is its investment in the Berbice Bridge. When financing for the bridge was first sought, the Society was approached by Mr Winston Brassington for a $3B investment. Independent consultant Raymond Gaskin questioned both the lawfulness and the viability of the investment and it is understood that on a split-decision the board, with Mr Moen McDoom as Chairman, accepted the advice and rejected the approach but went for $350M, a sum it was “prepared to lose.” Just over one year later the board with Dr Gopaul as Chairman reversed itself, and according to the financial statements bought bridge bonds with a face value of $1.5B. Regrettably the financial statements do not disclose the price paid for those bonds, but it is believed that they were bought at face value. More controversially, not only did the board reverse itself, but from all reports it did so by way of round-robin, ie without a physical meeting of the directors.

The composition of the board has changed significantly since its rejection of the $3B overture. Of the four who voted against the investment Mr McDoom has been replaced by Dr Nanda Gopaul, Director Secretary Mr Maurice Arjoon’s services have been terminated and directors Leon Rockliffe and Steve Bovell were voted off the board. As a result of the changes, the board with one exception is now made up of persons close to the government or the ruling party, some of whom are in receipt of compensation from the public purse. Mr Clement DeNobrega, a professionally qualified accountant who was elected as a director in April 2008 resigned some five months later, apparently dissatisfied with the way the board conducts the business of the Society. Once again there is no accountant on the board nor, as far as I am aware, is there any governance committee in the Society. Mr Kenneth Joseph, Head of NAACIE and the pro-government breakaway trade union organisation FITUG, was appointed by the board to fill the vacancy left by Mr DeNobrega’s resignation. His appointment is to be confirmed at the AGM.

Another possible reason for the reversal of the decision to invest in the Bonds may have to do with note 23 to the financial statements: Events After the Balance Sheet Date. This reports ambiguously that the Society’s retirement benefit plan held at December 31, 2008 a flexible annuity policy with Clico amounting to $110.9M. Note 12 to the financial statements devotes a full two pages to the plan, but did not refer to note 23. The directors should not by their silence encourage speculation that the Society may have undertaken the purchase of the bonds from Clico on the understanding that it could deduct the value of the policy from the purchase price of the bonds. That is a possibility fraught with serious legal implications and requires an unambiguous statement from the board which despite the public furore over the matter has so far not even publicly acknowledged the purchase.

Governance and risk
With the recent purchase significantly altering the composition of the Society’s assets and liquidity position, the Society is betting more than 40% of its accumulated profits on the Berbice Bridge Company meeting its annual interest obligations of about $800M. The financial projections were considered “overly optimistic” by the independent consultant. If the Bridge Company is unable to do so, then the Society could find itself along with other bondholders having to mark down the investment in its accounts. A proper analysis would have to wait on the release of financial statements of the Berbice Bridge Company.

The liquidity situation of the Society will be further eroded as it engages on the construction of a new, near billion-dollar head office in Georgetown. Consulting work in connection with that building is now the subject of a court action, but the investment itself is hardly the type of investment any risk-conscious entity would undertake in an uncertain financial environment.

Governance and the Bank of Guyana
One concern that has been vociferously expressed recently is the non-supervision of the Society by the financial regulator, the Bank of Guyana (BoG). The bank does not dispute that the Society carries on financial business as defined by the Financial Institutions Act which requires it to have a licence issued by the BoG. Yet it has inexplicably failed to enforce this provision. Such laxity by the regulator can have serious implications for any financial institution, let alone one that is subject to the control of persons with strong political affiliations and no private sector experience.

Without such a licence the Society does not operate within the FIA, which among other things provides for single borrowers limits to minimise the impact of a failure of a single loan or investment. Even if the Bridge Company investment was lawful, had the FIA applied to the Society then it would have been prevented from investing more than approximately $1.2B in the Bridge Company. The Society would also have been subject to the reserve requirement and its directors to the “fit and proper test.” It is hardly likely that such a loaded board could collectively be considered “fit and proper” to direct the operations of the third largest financial institution in the country.

Governance and members
The decision by the Society to hold its first ever meeting outside of Georgetown in 2008 followed a contentious meeting in September 2007 requisitioned by members who questioned the board about a fraud, the existence and implications of which it had stoutly denied. Those members were vindicated when the Society was left to make good the fraud to the tune of $73M. This time the dissatisfaction is about the adequacy and contents of the notice of Saturday’s meeting. By law, notice must be given 21 (clear) days prior to the meeting which does not appear to have been the case. Item 8 on the agenda seeks to increase the lending limit from $10M to $12M and beyond, even as the quality of the assets to secure lending has been diluted both by practice and the Berbice Bridge Company Act 2006. The implications are huge – higher lending and lower security will lead to higher provisioning and loan losses.

Governance and the auditors
By a notice in Friday’s newspapers the Society is proposing to replace long-serving auditors Jack A Alli, Sons & Co “in accordance with Rule No. 16 of the Act.” Apart from the statutory rules governing change of auditors there is also professional guidance under which any auditor proposed for nomination should seek professional clearance from the outgoing auditors. My understanding is that this has not been done. This could lead to an absurdity if it had to wait until after the meeting. In any case the outgoing auditors would be represented at the meeting to answer any questions, should these arise.

The proposed new auditors are Solomon, Parmessar & Co, headed by Mr Maurice Solomon, a director of the National Insurance Scheme. At a minimum this late change which appears to have taken the outgoing auditors by surprise must be regarded with considerable concern, since a change in auditors is done only for very good reasons.

Conclusion
Despite the mounting concerns the Bank of Guyana seems unwilling to act in a timely manner. It failed to do so with Globe Trust. It failed to act with Clico in connection with its deposit-taking. It should not fail the members of the Society. A group calling itself the Concerned Members of the NBS (including the writer) will be meeting Tuesday coming to decide on its participation at the AGM.

Recent developments involving Clico, the NIS, the NBS and Hand-in-Hand Trust show how contagion plays out in the financial and credit markets. The role of regulations is to prevent, detect and minimise such contagion. But effective regulations require as well independence and will. The NBS offers the Bank of Guyana another opportunity to show that it is on the ball.

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Clico, the NBS and NIS

Introduction
Clico is by far the worst financial disaster ever to have hit Guyana. For hundreds of thousands of Guyanese the Clico saga is direct, personal and painful, a real life disaster in which many could be made paupers. And even if that calamity is averted, the so-called guarantee that the people and the opposition have been calling for will have two effects. First, the taxpayers will be worse off by several billions of dollars. And second, having demanded heads for the Clico fiasco, the opposition members of the National Assembly will give the government a crucial let-off. When it did have the opportunity, instead of mounting an investigation into Clico and related matters, the National Assembly simply asked the Economics Affairs Committee to monitor the Clico affair.

Clico in combination with Stanford is the public face of unprecedented fraud in the securities sense of the word, practically non-existent corporate governance, outrageously bad regulatory failures, an arrogant display of political ineptitude, and inexcusable conflicts of interest and duty in various manifestations. The two are our Enron, Madoff and Satyam wrapped in one. They are the stuff of which bestsellers are made; of heroes and villains exchanging roles and of juicy material for the economic historians. They offer the potential for the most intriguing legal cases of breach of fiduciary obligation, fraud, lifting the veil of incorporation in the private sector and misfeasance in the public sector.

Winding up Clico
Despite the urgency of the matter, the Economic Affairs Committee of the National Assembly has done nothing so far. The Judicial Manager of Clico, Ms Maria van Beek is supporting the retention of (former?) Clico CEO Ms Geeta Singh-Knight who up to recently Ms van Beek was saying had persistently breached the Insurance Act. Ms van Beek must be aware that in her other role as Commissioner of Insurance she has a continuing duty to prosecute those involved in such breaches and that her endorsement of the retention of Ms Singh-Knight could be construed as granting her immunity. When Ms van Beek first approached the court she asked, as an alternative to her first choice of winding-up, to be appointed as Judicial Manager. Now she seems unclear of the nature and extent of the duties involved. Even if the Insurance Act is unclear, she should be guided by commonsense, experience, professional advice and as necessary, by the court. Logic dictates that the closest analogy to the Judicial Manager is the Receiver Manager under the Companies Act. That person displaces the management and takes control of the company. What is wrong with that formulation?

Having asked the court for a winding-up order the Judicial Manager seems bent on vindicating her initial judgment. Neither she nor the government has shown any interest in saving Clico. If they wanted to save Clico and jobs then Trinidad provided a most recent and eminently sensible model – take over the company and use the very funds of the Jagdeo guarantee as capital injection. But because of the ambivalence and dithering of the government and the Judicial Manager, Clico is collapsing faster than anyone could have predicted.

Breach of promise
And perhaps there should be a mild reminder that President Jagdeo promised that small depositors in Globe Trust would be protected. Several years later, not a single, blind cent has been paid, despite the finding of the then Chief Justice that the regulator was partly responsible. In the case of Clico, President Jagdeo again has made promises but when it comes to confirming that promise, his party in the National Assembly is silent. They and the President know that the public has become accustomed to broken promises.

Mr Jagdeo has said that Clico is insignificant in the wider scheme of things – only 3%! But does the President realize that the Clico/Stanford duo now pose a risk to the New Building Society (NBS), the National Insurance Scheme (NIS), Hand-in-Hand Trust, Trust Company Guyana Limited and undisclosed pension schemes over several sectors? Mr Jagdeo claims to be guaranteeing the Clico clients but what about the pension schemes – are their members any less important?

Milking the NBS cow
Carefully built up some sixty years ago out of the ashes of its failed predecessor, the NBS through conservative and tight-fisted management under the late Jules De Cambra, was one of the strongest financial institutions in the country. Under Moen McDoom and Nanda Gopaul, that soundness has been slipping away. It is history that the NBS was cajoled into investing in the Berbice Bridge. Its own independent consultant said it was a bad idea, that the assumptions underlying the financial projections were way too optimistic. Some members of the board were scared but not wishing to upset the government opted for a considerably smaller investment − an amount that the NBS could afford to lose. Next the board decided to spend several hundreds of millions of dollars on a state-of-the-art head office, causing two of its directors to resign in protest. Now, as Clico started to sink, the NBS again featured as a lifeline and the politicians went to work – turning up the heat and milking the NBS cow.

My understanding is that the Board of the NBS, which does not have any financial specialist and did not even meet in person to decide on buying Clico’s bonds in the bridge for $1.5B. However that decision may have been made, Dr Gopaul and his fellow directors have a duty to justify their decision to the members of the NBS. So far, the bridge is generating far less than Mr Jagdeo had predicted. It did not meet its 2008 interest obligations in their entirety. While the bridge company enjoys the most generous package of tax concessions imaginable, it will struggle to meet its obligations to pay interest or redeem the bonds as they fall due. To add to the risks, there is explicitly no government guarantee.

Despite the slippages, the government and the Bank of Guyana seem very comfortable with NBS remaining completely unregulated. The soundness of the NBS which this column has consistently praised has been undermined by the decisions and practices of the board and its bridge investment. That investment which had to be sanctioned by the Minister of Finance became possible when government did an underhand amendment to the NBS Act, through the Berbice Bridge Act. The NBS’s investment in the bridge now amounts to 40% of its reserves – an over concentration in a single company. No doubt we will hear from the President that we should not worry, that such investment represents only a small percentage of the assets of the financial sector. That is what the government said about Clico and the Bank of Guyana repeated in relation to the Hand-in-Hand Trust.

As political players gain the ascendancy at the bank it is becoming increasingly subservient to the Ministry of Finance, its role diminished to collecting statistics and undertaking bank inspections. It is abandoning − or doing very badly − one of its most important roles, the oversight of the financial sector.

Milking the NIS
The other institution under severe stress from Clico and the bridge is the NIS. Again we see the overlapping roles of the Minister of Finance, other government politicians and public and private sector functionaries at various levels, but connected in one way or the other to the Office of the President. One of the members of the NIS Board is also a director of the Berbice Bridge Inc. Two leading companies have used NIS funds to invest in the Berbice Bridge and have been rewarded with seats on the board of the Bridge Company − the same company in which Mr Winston Brassington confidently guaranteed “investors” in the bridge that the “NIS will not have a director” or be able “to exercise any influence” (Business Page March 12, 2006).

Several weeks ago, I wrote the Minister of Finance about the legality of the NIS investments, having in mind the bridge, Clico and the Hand-in-Hand Insurance Company. Investments made by the NIS are required to be approved by the Co-operative Finance Administration of which the Chairman is the Minister of Finance and who appoints all its directors. He has not responded to me. The board, it seems, is operating under an Investment Framework prepared by Mr Patrick van Beek. That framework had no reference to the restrictions imposed by the act but was accepted by cabinet. If it turns out that the investments are unlawful surely there are many who should be held responsible including the entire board of the NIS.

The NIS directly and indirectly is the largest investor in the Berbice Bridge which the government likes to boast is a private sector initiative. The manner in which Mr Brassington cajoled the NIS into investing in the bridge is a matter of public record, and the country’s collective failure to take note then is coming back to haunt us. Of course this is not the first time that the government is undermining the NIS’s finances. We recall that the government forced the NIS to lend it US$4M for the part-financing of the construction of the Caricom Secretariat. That loan is repayable over 25 years at a rate of 4% in the first 15 years and 5% in the next ten years. Those rates are well below the rates of inflation, but does the government care how the cow is milked?

Conclusion
The cost of the Clico failure is mounting, but with ‘Clico fatigue’ already setting in public interest may wane. For the NIS and NBS the implications are huge. The Minister of Finance, the government, the regulators and the directors of the NBS would be the beneficiaries of ‘Clico fatigue.’ The misuse of the NIS funds which began with small sums now involves billions. The risky investments of the NBS have likewise increased from millions to billions. The public has to show more interest while the opposition parties need to be more consistent and persistent.

Will we ever get to the bottom of the Clico saga? Unlikely. The PNCR, which endorsed the assurances given by the government on a Clico bailout, is now calling for an “urgent and impartial” inquiry. Aware that any inquiry will only confirm their massive failures and deception of the public, the government will stoutly resist such an inquiry. As far as the Finance Minister is concerned he has outmanoeuvred the opposition by his 16-page rambling in the National Assembly. The actions (or inactions) of the government and Clico’s Judicial Manager suggest that Clico will soon be dead and gone. All it will leave to its Children of Guyana are massive debts.

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Information which was challenged in column came from Insurance Commissioner’s office

The tone of the March 3 letter of Commissioner of Insurance Maria Van Beek seems to suggest that she is reacting to the pressure from several quarters over her supervision of Clico. To accuse sections of the victims of the worst insurance failure in the country under her watch of making “reckless, uninformed and irresponsible pronouncements” (GINA release published March 1) might seem to indicate that Ms Van Beek is reluctant to acknowledge the scale of the problem or the extent of public concerns about potential personal and national losses of billions of dollars. Even if the government gives a complete bailout of Clico it is we the taxpayers who will pay it, while those who contributed to the crisis lecture us on how much they have done to protect us.

A number of persons have suggested to me that I should respond to the three issues she challenged me on: 1) the statutory fund/assets; 2) her reason for the approach to the court for a winding up of Clico; and 3) the name of the company, Clico.

1. I never claim to be an expert on insurance, accounting or indeed on any subject. However Ms Van Beek can rest assured that the provisions of the Insurance Act, including the difference between statutory assets and the statutory fund, would not escape any practising accountant. It is Ms Van Beek who has some explaining to do for apparently missing the assertion in Clico’s 2007 financial statements that the company had a “statutory fund” of $46 million and not the $9B she says it should be! As the expert and regulator of the sector, Ms Van Beek should tell the public what steps she took to have such an error in the audited financial statements rectified in a timely manner.

2. Ms Van Beek claims that I accused her of saying that it was Clico’s business model and investment strategy from which its problem stemmed. I did not invent that. Ms Van Beek said so in paragraph 10 of her affidavit. Ms Van Beek has insisted that it was the decision by The Bahamas authority to liquidate their Clico that triggered her move to the courts. It is not that decision which imperilled Clico Guyana’s investments.

Those unlawful and injudicious investments were impaired long before the move by The Bahamas authorities and required action, not excuse. But no, she waited until the property market in the US had collapsed taking with it huge amounts of Clico’s funds and then waited even further and longer on the Bahamian authorities.

3. Ms Van Beek writes that I wrote from an uninformed position concerning the name of the company. In her very affidavit she also refers to the company as SA!

In other words, everything Ms Van Beek accuses me of came out of her office.

Finally let me say that I welcome the press statement made by Ms Van Beek on the state of the company and note that she has taken several of the steps I advocated some weeks ago, including calling in the debts and guarantees of the related parties and giving specific advice to policyholders about the state of their insurance coverage. However she continues to repeat the vague promise she “attributes” to President Jagdeo that “no policyholder in Clico (Guyana) will lose their money.”

By now she should have sought written confirmation from the Minister of Finance to whom she reports, and not the President, of the precise nature and scope of the guarantee which in my view has to have parliamentary approval. Perhaps Stabroek News can clarify their report that Ms Van Beek “re-emphasised the assurances given by President Bharrat Jagdeo and Finance Minister Dr Ashni Singh, that no one with investments in the company will lose their money.” That goes well beyond policyholders and was not contained in the statement issued to the press. It would however naturally raise the hopes of investors including the NIS. It would be painful if that assurance turns out to be false.