Category: Public sector

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It is time that Guyana has a proper Auditor General

A recent news item in the print media gave the impression that the appointments of four senior members of the Audit Office’s staff have already been made by the long-acting Auditor General Mr Deodat Sharma. That would conflict with the Audit Act under which any proposed appointment first must have the approval of the Public Accounts Committee.

I am concerned that this attempt by Mr Sharma – which not surprisingly has received the support of the head honchos of the PPP/C members of the Public Accounts Committee – is a precursor for himself to be confirmed. Clearly, if the number two position from which he was moved up is subsequently filled, he cannot then step back into it, if and when a decision is finally made to appoint a qualified Auditor General from outside the Audit Office.

Mr Sharma has many handicaps. The first is that he is does not have the qualification to be the Auditor General. Accordingly, he has to rely on – as his key qualified staff – the wife of the Minister of Finance who is responsible for the country’s public finances generally and solely responsible for the Contingencies Fund.

The lack of that competence that comes with professional training has meant that in the six audit reports on the public accounts Mr. Sharma has issued since he was appointed to act, he could do no better than identify two major issues – the tendering procedures for drug purchases and the fact that the drawings from the Contingencies Fund did not meet the qualifying test. But he did not initiate the disclosures – they were continuing developments identified by his predecessors.

In relation to the Contingencies Fund, his reports consistently misquote the law relating to replenishments – conveniently to the advantage of the Minister – and second and very importantly, he does not report findings on the actual payments. No wonder it takes him more than three months to report on a $90 million expenditure in an engagement in which he is taking a lead role. Such an audit should take a pair of reasonably capable junior auditors properly guided two weeks maximum.

Mr Sharma has made lots of promises before. He promised in the 2009 Audit Report to complete before December 2010 value for money audits of the drug purchases by the Ministry of Health and the tender procedures of the government. Before that he had promised audits of the Cricket World Cup, Carifesta and the 2005 Flood Audit. And of course, he had promised that by end of April 2012 he would have completed the $90 million audit of Contingencies Fund, a promise accepted by the National Assembly.

It is impossible to say whether Mr Sharma is as keen to be confirmed in the job as the government is to have someone who hesitates to go after Mr Ramkarran’s “pervasive corruption.” The compensation package now enjoyed by Mr Sharma is the same as that of the Chief Justice and the Chancellor. It would seem that it is as normal for no one to risk giving up such an undeserved package as it is for no government to appoint, even in an acting capacity, a Chancellor or Chief Justice possessing only a para-legal degree.

The Constitution of Guyana provides that whether as a substantive appointment or acting Auditor General, the appointment of the Auditor General is made by the President acting in accordance with the advice of the Public Service Commission.Whether or not President Ramotar wants to deal with corruption, it is time that Guyana has a proper Auditor General.

Once a substantive Auditor General has been appointed, that person working with the Public Accounts Committee can then address the other senior positions and indeed the rest of the staffing of the Audit Office, including the issue of conflict of interest under the Code of Conduct governing accountants.

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On the line – Guyana Power and Light, Inc, 2007-2010

Introduction
Amidst the din and controversy of ‘to cut or not to cut’, Guyana Power and Light Inc, the country’s number one, state-owned electricity supplier was voted the sum of five billion dollars in the 2012 Budget. This is $1 billion less than requested by the Finance Minister as a 2012 budget measure. It is a topsy-turvy world for GPL. In 2009 the company reported profits after tax of $1.8 billion and at December 31, 2010 the company was sitting on cash resources of $2.8 billion, perhaps the highest ever cash balance reported by any Guyana company outside of the commercial banks.

As this column surveys the operations of the company over the four years 2007-2010, a scenario emerges of a yo-yo performance with losses of $1.6 billion in 2007 and $1.9 billion in 2008 and profits of $1.8 billion in 2009 and $553 million in 2010. And nine months after reporting the cash hoard, taxpayers in 2011 were forking out $1.5 billion from the increasingly abused Contingencies Fund in subsidies.

Chairman Winston Brassington explained, or rather excused the significant 69.4% fall in 2010 profits from 2009 as largely on account of an increase in fuel costs of $3.5 billion above 2009 costs of $13.1 billion. This is surprising because the company has been spending massive sums to reconfigure its plants to enable it to use the lower cost Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO). And with some success: raising HFO use to 80% in 2010. The word is that the problems might lie much deeper than the cost of fuel and may have something to do with huge bungling at the Cane Field operations in Berbice. But that is supposed to be a secret.

Losses
In his 2010 report, the Chairman speaks of a 3% reduction in technical and commercial losses which he attributed to overall efficiencies from the implementation of the new US$3M customer information system, meter change-out programmes and efforts to reduce thefts. If the 2011 figures confirm the reported 3% decline, that would be very good news. Particularly since the 2010 performance is in spite of an increase in technical losses from an estimated 13.4% in 2009 to 14.3% in 2010, which the Chairman attributes to the “distribution and transmission network reflecting its age and limited capacity relative to demand.”

Total generation in 2010 was 626 GWh (gigawatt hours) of which GuySuCo Skeldon – using Wartsila generators – supplied GPL with 60 GWh, with the remaining 566 GWh being produced by GPL. Of the GPL portion, 441 GWh (78%) was generated by GPL owned, but Wartsila operated units and 125 GWh (22%) from GPL owned and operated generating sets. Surely this makes it all the more troubling that the company maintains perhaps the highest paid set of top management in any company in Guyana – an average of ten million dollars per annum for 29 employees – including arguably the highest paid CEO in the country.

Over the period peak demand has ranged from 94.8 MW in 2007 to 100.6 MW in 2010 while available capacity has been 124 MH in 2007 to 124.3 MW in 2009 and 121.5 MW in 2010. The company does a poor job therefore of load planning and/or explaining why across the country consumers have to face outages with such irritating frequency.

Income statement
Here are some extracts from the income statements for the years 2007 to 2010.

Turnover has increased over the four year period by 33.8% while generation cost has risen by a smaller 17.6%. Indeed generation cost in 2007 was 85% of turnover and in 2010 it was 74.9%. According to the Chairman the revenue growth reflects the increased number of customers and volume, as well as a portion of the loss reduction benefits flowing into revenue.

Employment cost as a percentage of turnover was 12.8% in 2007 but declined to 8.8% in 2010. It is an interesting statistic that 3% of the employees account for 16% of the employment cost. No wonder then that the Chairman in his 2010 report explained the remuneration of the management team is “reflective of international standards.” Reflecting the increasing share of outsourcing, employment numbers fell by 30% between 2007 (1320 employees) and 2009 (912 employees) but rose again in 2010 by 94 to 1006 employees.

Interest cost has declined from $403 million to $90 million as the government seems to absorb increasing sums of debts for the company and converts net liabilities into equity on which any returns are looking extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future.

The only payment of taxes reflected in the company’s cash flow statement is a sum of $77 million in 2010, despite the substantial profits in 2009 and 2010 and the charges for property taxes in each of the years 2007 to 2010.

Balance sheet
The company’s net equity position has increased from $8.2 billion to $12.0 billion while its fixed assets have increased from $11.2 billion to $16.8 billion, or some 49%. With the company’s billing system improving, the $4.8 billion of accounts receivables on a turnover of $26.6 billion, or 66 days worth of sales, is still high. But that $4.8 billion is net of $6 billion provision for bad debts, excluding related parties balances. That makes the collection situation desperate with the provision for bad debts at 60% of customer account balances.

The Chairman reports that collections were 99.6% of 2010 billings which would suggest that the bulk of the accounts receivables is irrecoverable and will have to be written off. Since the provision has already been made such action will have no impact on the income statement.

Another account receivable under serious doubts is the related party balance of $791 million net from the state partner-in-need GuySuCo. Any payment of this balance in the near future will have to come from the government, which really means the taxpayer.

On the liability side the company is shown as owing some $22 billion, with the prospects of actual cash outlays being about $15 billion, mainly to the government for the use of PetroCaribe funds, Infrastructural Development Project and an IDB loan and to third parties of another $3 billion.

The question which the National Assembly should have asked is how much of the $5 billion subsidy will be going to pay operating debts and how much to capital expenditure which is being partly financed by the Chinese and to a lesser extent the IDB.

Theft
Much is made of the efforts to stamp out electricity theft. The company is looking at the wrong places. Yes, there are some working class areas where theft is indeed rampant. But it takes only one businessman to steal the electricity consumed by 500 hundred and more small consumers. What is worse the company knows who the real thieves are but they are some of the country’s “reputable” business persons – the same ones who dodge corporation tax, pay their employees under the table, convert VAT to other income and who will run to the courts pleading their innocence! If we want to deal with electricity theft we have to deal with the real thieves, not the small thieves.

Conclusion
If the situation is seen to be bad now, Amaila will make it worse. The company can now sell only around 600 MWH. Yet it has to guarantee the purchase from Sithe Global of approximately 900 MWH. It will have to pay for that at the switch, whether or not it can sell the power. When Amaila comes on stream, GPL will still have to keep its own plant and that of Wartsila as the back-up. GuySuCo will find that GPL no longer needs it. Leguan and Wakenaam will have to continue operating as they do now. The current costs being met by GPL will not disappear.

The prospects for GPL are not good. Its GuySuCo receivable balance is in jeopardy. Its recent survival has been due to the grace of the Consolidated Fund. Its management has failed to reduce one of its most expensive costs – commercial losses – because they are looking in the wrong direction. The company has spent billions on transmission and distribution without any noticeable results. Lured by Chinese renminbi, it is taking on some huge debts not related to Amaila. These will have to be serviced. Amaila will simply be too heavy a burden for GPL.

But then its Chairman Winston Brassington is also the executor-in-chief of NICIL which will impose Amaila on GPL – whether they like it or not. Or whether there is a conflict or not.

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On the Line: National Communications Network Inc. (2004-2006) and Guyana National Newspapers Limited (2006-2008)

Introduction
Last week we sought to conclude our review of the financial statements of NCN for the three years from 2004 to 2006. Readers will recall that NCN recorded losses in each of the three years but massaged each year’s loss into a profit as a result of subventions from the state. Such operating subventions came to an abrupt end with President Ramotar’s assent to the legislation withdrawing $81 million of proposed subvention although an amount of $65 million has been approved under the Office of the President for capital expenditure for NCN.

I commented last week on the poor quality of the information contained in the audited financial statements as well as on what appears to be unacceptably poor audit quality by Mr Deodat Sharma, long acting Auditor General. NCN does not show segmented information derived from its distinct operations such as Television and Radio, and it was not therefore possible to analyse the information presented. Using the revenue numbers for 2006 and applying available television hours only, the recovery rate hovers around 20%. If, as must be the case, part of the reported revenues is derived from radio then something is seriously wrong with the marketing, management, finance and production departments of the company.

It boggles the mind that an entity that generates revenue of more than half-a-billion dollars, that enjoys very known tax concessions, that has access to all the material of the government‘s formidable information capacity and that has not had to meet any economic or commercial test, cannot make a profit. But let us move on to the Guyana National Newspapers Limited, the printers and publishers of the Guyana Chronicle which boasts on its masthead that it is the country’s most widely circulated newspaper.

GNNL
In my research for today’s column I found that the company had very recently submitted to the Registrar of Companies its 2007 and 2008 financial statements and reports contained in a single good quality report that fails to identify its printer. While welcoming the apparent attempt at improved filings with a view to eventual compliance with the law, one must still wonder why the filing for 2007 was not done ever since the audit report was issued in October 2008. This comment applies too in respect of 2008, the audit report for which was issued since November 2009.

One cannot be sure why the Chairman Keith Burrowes, an advocate of accountability, would have held back on the 2007 report in which he reported on exceedingly favourable performance by the company and failed to address for 2008 some of the operational challenges facing the company, including a balance sheet that does not show a true and fair view. Surely any responsible chairman would follow the advice of his auditors and make some provision against doubtful debts.

Big loss
In his 2008 report he simply acknowledged the loss and then looked for its causes. What he failed to explain however is how in the space of one year the company can turn a profit of $26.2 million into loss of $7.3 million. To be fair, the directors do state in their report that the concept of good corporate governance has become one of the company’s cornerstones, and that it has an internal auditor who reports to the Chairman. The legal advisor is listed as Ms Jaya Manickchand who enjoys political connections with the government and who was recently made a Gecom Commissioner by the PPP/C.

Despite the welcome appointment of an internal auditor, one of the first things to note is that the audit report has moved from a clean opinion in 2006 and 2007 to an adverse opinion in 2008 in which the auditor indicates that the company’s financial statements do not give a true and fair view of the company’s financial position, its performance and its cash flows for the year. This extreme position was taken by the auditors because of the uncertainty that some $50 million shown as receivables will be collected. If these, as the auditors fear, are not recovered then some 18% of the total assets of the company will have vanished.

The Board it seems is in denial about these balances, and one must wonder how many are political debts for the 2006 elections or for the supply of newspapers to government agencies and departments, which are practically imposed. At some point the company has to bite the bullet or the auditor may have to withdraw from the engagement.

Significantly, there are no notes on related party transactions or balances making the claim of good corporate governance hollow, even by way of discussions.

Statement of income

Source: Audited financial statements

As the table above shows revenue has fallen in both 2007 and 2008 with a reduction in revenue in 2008 of $2 million per month, or roughly 7%, or 10% over the two years 2006 to 2008. In 2007 the company cushioned the $14 million fall in revenue by reducing expenditure by $20 million, as a result of which profits almost doubled. By contrast, in 2008 expenditure actually increased while sales declined, the classic double whammy.

According to Chairman Mr Keith Burrowes, the increase was due primarily to higher raw material costs which account for 23% of total expenditure, fuel and electricity 6% and labour 41%. The company must be one of the few entities that has managed to reduce their electricity/fuel costs, doing so by a whopping 18%. The company too, must be one of the first public sector entities in recent times to engage in voluntary staff reduction with the labour force declining from 117 employees in 2003 to 93 in 2008, or the equivalent of one lay-off for every five! Labour cost in the same period has shown an interesting curve dipping between 2004 and 2007 but then jumping by 15% in 2008. Average annual employment cost per person increased significantly over the period:


Source: Chairman’s report 2008

What was also noticeable was that even when the company slashed the number of staff from 102 to 92 in 2007, its salary bill declined by a mere 2.4%, suggesting that it was the low level staff who were terminated.

Statement of financial position

Source: Audited financial statements

I have already referred to the concerns of the auditors about the receivables figure which must inevitably include substantial amounts owed by government agencies. I would add another caveat and that is in relation to the level of inventories which showed a 51% increase in 2008 over 2007, from $37 million to $56.0 million. The company’s circulation is falling to what would normally be considered unsustainably low levels, and one has to speculate on the rationality of buying newsprint when the prices are at one of their historic peaks. In any case, unless the entire industry in Guyana and abroad has it wrong, the company’s inventory holding makes no commercial sense.

For a full four years, the balance sheet of the company has been carrying a dividend payable figure of $18.1 million and one must wonder why the Privatisation Unit/NICIL, which claims to consolidate GNNL’s financial statements into its own, has not taken up these dividends given that they became legally due when passed at the relevant AGM.

Falling circulation
But with all the deniability of its receivables and the uncertainty about its inventories, the real story of GNNL is best told in its circulation numbers. On page 25 of the 2008 annual report there is a chart intituled Circulation Average (2004-2008). While the directors deserve credit for this disclosure, the manner in which the time series run is misleading. The numbers on the left of the chart are the lowest and instinct would lead one to think that the upward movement to the right points to higher circulation in the later years. Alas, it is just the opposite. The reader reviewing the chart from right to left soon realizes that the circulation has in fact been falling and the bars on the left – the lowest – are the most recent, ie, up to 2008. A clearer presentation is as follows:


Chart: Circulation figures 2003 – 2008

A closer look at revenue from newspaper circulation reveals an average 33% discount on the cover price which might be considered high for the industry. To add to the effective cost, the company spends almost 25% of net circulation revenue on circulation costs and therefore incurs total costs of almost 50% on the cover price. Advertising income represents 64.9% of total income in 2008 compared to 59.9% in 2006 and no doubt a substantial proportion of that income is from government. But there is a complete lack of disclosure of related party transactions from which one would have been able to determine the exact influence on the company. These are some of the issues which Mr Burrowes chose to side-step.

Conclusion
This review has highlighted the many failings of the accounting and auditing of the two major commercial communication arms of the state. The fuzzy accounting at NCN was below even the most modest standard of acceptability while the financial statements of the Chronicle company have been certified as wrong and misstated.

Chronicle is heading for some real challenges, while the NCN will soon be forced to run like a business. Unfortunately, given the number of years in arrears, Guyanese will have to endure many more annual reports before we have an insight into how they cope.

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In accordance with the law?

Page 414 of the March 15 parliamentary debate on Paper 7 for replenishment of the Contingencies Fund, Mr Khemraj Ramjattan, the AFC MP drew the attention of the National Assembly to section 24 of the Fiscal Management and Accountability Act (FMAA) which requires the Finance Minister, “when introducing a supplementary appropriation Bill, [to] present to the National Assembly the reasons for the proposed variations and provide a supplementary document describing the impact that the variations, if approved will have on the financial plan in the annual budget.”

The Speaker, either because he did not appreciate that such supplementary document ought already to have been presented or because he wanted to take his ‘brother’ off the hook, intervened as follows:

“Speaker: Hon Minister of Finance, will you be in a position to give an undertaking that you will accord and abide by the conditions of the Act?”

Most persons would have to think for a moment or two to come up with a convenient excuse. Others will simply lie. Without a blink, instead of being gracious and honest in accepting such a generous hand from the Speaker, Dr Singh chose to respond as follows:

“Dr Singh: Mr Speaker, as has always been the case [emphasis added], the relevant submission will be made in accordance with the law.”

The truth is that Dr Singh has never once presented at any stage, in close to fifteen supplementary appropriations bills introduced by him since 2006, any supplementary document required by section 24 of the FMAA. The irony is that on this particular occasion he could simply have said that since the year had already expired, the supplementary document was really academic and he did not think it would serve any useful purpose. But, no, Dr Singh had to misrepresent on the parliamentary record an impeccable compliance record since his ego was more important than the truth.

Not that Dr Singh’s action on this occasion was surprising. He sat silent while his ministerial colleague Irfaan Ally misled the National Assembly over the earlier $4 billion transaction with GuySuCo. He played a leading role in either misleading the public about CLICO concealing the truth and so too concerning the Kingston Marriot. And most importantly and currently, he is central to the NICIL illegalities.

So consistent has Dr Singh been that I cannot be confident about what he would say if asked similar questions about the tabling of any of the following:

1. the annual report and audited financial statements of NICIL;
2. filing of annual returns of NICIL at the Deeds Registry;
3. the annual mid-year report within sixty-days of June 30 under the FMAA;
4. the annual report of the GRA;
5. the annual report of the NIS;
6. loan agreements under the External Loans Act.

But Dr Singh’s distortions go beyond these. He failed to disclose to the National Assembly that in 2010 he closed dormant accounts with balances of more than $30 billion when the budgeted Norway funds did not arrive.

It is not only uncomfortable, but also dangerous to have a Finance Minister who puts his ego ahead of the truth.

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On the Line – National Communications Network Inc. (2004-2006) and Guyana National Newspapers Limited 2006

Statutory framework
Business Page was able to access the annual reports of the National Communications Network Inc (NCN) for the three years from 2004 to 2006 and for Guyana National Newspapers Limited (GNNL) for 2006. These reports were obtained from the Deeds Registry where they are required to be filed no later than August 11 following the close of the year. I also did a search in the parliamentary library and was assured that there were no later filings, thus confirming that these two government companies are grossly delinquent in meeting their statutory obligations. But their responsible Minister was similarly delinquent in laying the companies’ annual reports and audited accounts in the National Assembly. I will return to this shortly.

In addition to their obligations under the Companies Act, all government companies (defined in the Companies Act as 51% government shareholding) are subject to sections 48 and 49 of the Public Corporations Act. This requires government companies, no later than six months after the end of each calendar year, to submit to the Minister a report containing:

(a) an account of its transactions throughout the preceding calendar year in such detail as the Minister may direct;

(b) a statement of the accounts of the company audited in accordance with section 345.

The Minister then has up to September 30 to lay before the National Assembly a copy of the report together with a copy of the auditor’s report. This was not done for either NCN or GNNL.

The directors of NCN as shown in the last annual return filed for the year 2006 were Ms Jennifer Webster, (Minister) and Mr Desmond Noor Mohammed, Chartered Accountant and long-time supporter of the PPP. One of the signatories of the balance sheet is Mr Winston Brassington, Executive Director of NICIL.

The directors of GNNL as shown in their annual return for 2006 are Messrs Keith Burrowes, Hydar Ally, David De Groot, Tota Mangar, Patrick Dyal, Kwame McCoy and Colin Alfred.

Non-compliance
Despite the assertion in the audit reports on the financial statements of the two companies, both sets of financial statements are far, far away from compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the basic requirements for the preparation of financial statements under the Companies Act.

Specifically, there is a complete lack of disclosures in the financial statements rendering analysis very difficult. The year 2005 was the first year of EU adoption of IFRS’s so by the end of 2006, there were substantial developments with several new standards coming into effect which would have required far more disclosure. But as we shall see the defects and deficiencies are even more basic.

NCN
NCN describes itself as a “State Owned and Operated Radio and Television Stations” with the parent company being National Industrial and Commercial Investments Limited. NCN went into operation on March 1, 2004 following the transfer to it of the assets and liabilities of the Guyana Broadcasting Corporation and the Guyana Television Company Limited. The balance sheet of NCN at December 31, 2004 shows a Share Capital (sic) of $35,000,000 and Reserves of $554,536,331, presumably the difference between the value of the assets transferred to it and the amounts of the liabilities which it was asked to assume. In ordinary language it means that the government invested more than half-a-billion dollars to get NCN started.

The liabilities it inherited included a Provision for Corporation, Property and Other Taxes of $18.834 million but by the end of 2006 that amount remained unpaid with no further charge for taxation, even though there is no evidence that NCN is exempted from taxation. Indeed, instead of making some kind of return to the country for taxpayers’ investment, the company was granted some $175 million over the period March 1, 2004 to December 31, 2006 in government subventions.

NCN Statement of Income

Source: Annual Accounts

Reservation
I express reservation on the discussion that follows with the comment that the financial statements – the audit report of which is signed by someone who is not qualified to do so under the Companies Act – contain some very elementary accounting errors. At best, therefore, these financial statements are unreliable and misleading and had there been the appropriate expertise available, they would almost certainly have been rejected at the Deeds Registry and in the National Assembly.

The first point to note is that if the Revenue Subvention is excluded from the Income Statement NCN made operating losses for the ten months of 2004 and in 2005 and 2006. What is even more surprising is that in 2006 – an elections year that often brings an advertising bonanza – NCN could actually make a loss, a feat that can only be achieved under unusual managerial expertise.

The Contingencies Fund
Indeed in 2006 the Minister of Finance had to bail the company out with a $20 million advance from the Contingencies Fund. What makes the matter so nearly pathetic is that while the person signing the audit report – Deodat Sharma – is also the same person who signs the Auditor General report, NCN is showing the Contingencies Fund advance as outstanding while the report on the Public Accounts does not even acknowledge an advance, let alone a debt!

And in payables, NCN shows a liability to the Ministry of Finance, a related party, if ever there was one. The financial statements do not, however, show any related parties, compounding the difficulty in any appreciation and analysis of the statements.

Then in the Statement of Changes in Equity, there are items like capital subvention for flood relief funds (2005) and negative amounts for amortisation, the corresponding entry for which could not be traced.

Strange too is the disclosure that PAYE payable at December 31, 2006 was the same as 2005, as are the provisions for Taxation ($18,834,104), Loan Creditor – Ministry of Finance ($2,332,646) and Other Creditors $110,930). Meanwhile NCN kept racking up other debts and at December 31, 2006 NCN owed unidentified persons some $80,743,424, close to two years worth of cost of sales, while showing accrued expenses as an asset!

Old debts
And on the other side of the balance sheet, Receivables at that date amounted to $205.5 million, including some $48 million of inactive receivables for the Guyana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) and Linden which would hardly seem to be recoverable several years later and should certainly be written off. That still leaves some $157 million in other unpaid receivables at the end of 2006, an elections year. The question to be asked is how much did NCN bill the political parties for their elections advertisements and how much was paid by the end of the year?

Apart from the GBC and Linden receivable issue there were other concerns reflected in the audit opinion. The first relates to the failure by NCN to maintain an assets register for its more than $643 million worth of fixed assets and the failure to prepare and submit tax returns.

The range and nature of deficiencies identified in this analysis would do a disservice to a cake shop. NCN makes them look good. Just by way of information, one of the two persons signing the financial statements on behalf of the Board is Mr Winston Brassington of NICIL who was in the press recently attempting to teach the nation about accounting and the Companies Act.

To be continued