Mounting losses by GPL

Introduction
If everything goes according to plan and the new Kingston Power Plant finally comes into operation within the next week or two, Guyanese can expect a reduction in the spate of blackouts that for the better part of 2009 have been plaguing the business sector, torturing households, arousing tempers and making any planning almost impossible. So bad and widespread has the situation become that it is non-discriminatory in its impact – affecting with equal effect rural and urban Guyana alike; children at school and housewives at home; commerce and industry, successful and loss-making. The financial statements inform us that the company has spent some $3.1 billion in capital expenditure for 2008, obviously with more to come in 2009, though the level of capital commitments has not been disclosed. Whatever the technical (de)/merits of these massive sums, all borne in the final analysis by the long-suffering, impoverished consumers, any kind of relief will surely be welcome, not least so that Guyanese can have a lit, if not bright Christmas. This will indeed be good news even as the Guyana Power and Light Inc. (GPL) continues to haemorrhage money for the state and the taxpayers of this country.

According to GPL’s financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2008 posted on its website, the company racked up losses before tax in 2008 of $2.9 billion, a 23% increase over 2007 and close to double the corresponding loss two years earlier. What makes this loss even more significant is that over the same period the company has shed hundreds of employees even as a handful of senior staff are paid several millions of dollars each. The financial statements show the Government advancing to the company, cumulatively, more than $7 billion, much of it interest-free, whether authorised by the National Assembly or not being another matter. It is obviously hard to understand what drives this financial irrationality and one must wonder whether the Government is satisfied with the results following changes at the top of the company.

Haemorrhage
The past few years have seen a number of changes in the company including the replacement of former Chairman Chartered Accountant Ronald Alli with privatisation czar Mr. Winston Brassington, the appointment to the Board of PPP member Desmond Mohammed and Mr. Rajendra Singh, recently appointed Deputy CEO of Guysuco. Sitting on the GPL Board as well is Mr. Carvil Duncan of FITUG, who does not seem uncomfortable at the loss of hundreds of jobs under his watch. The shedding of jobs has taken place over the token, tepid opposition from Mr. Kenneth Joseph, President of the government-friendly National Association of Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Employees (NAACIE) to an earlier proposal to lay off 250 workers. Mr. Joseph may not have noticed but that number has been exceeded by more than 25%! It is hardly reassuring to the members of NAACIE that in the two entities in which the Union has historically been most effective – sugar and electricity – workers have seen their numbers shrink and influence reduced.

But it is not only money that the company has been losing. It is losing approximately one out of every three units of electricity it generates under the rubric of Technical and Commercial Losses, losses which have to be borne by consumers. In the past couple of years, it has also lost key management personnel including former Chief Executive Officer Rabindranath Singh, Deputy CEO Martica Thomas, Commercial Services Director Kesh Nandlall, Legal Officer Neil Bollers, and Human Resources Director Donna Tucker. Such a situation makes for depressing reading by consumers who in both absolute and relative terms pay some of the highest rates and receive some of the poorest service for electricity in the region.

Financial Highlights

2009.11.01_table1

Source: GPL’s Audited Financial Statements 2008.

But back to the finances
Total assets of the corporation increased in 2008 by $6 billion or 32%, even as inventory declined from $2.1 billion to $1.6 billion or approximately 25%. The largest drop in this asset group was in the value of fuel stock but disturbingly, the value of spares declined by 25%. Normally, as the value of plant and equipment increases, the spares to support them should increase as well, but this did not happen. Another major item in assets was what the accounts refer to as Deferred Tax Assets of $2 billion, of which a large proportion is in respect of the tax value of losses carried forward. It is open to speculation whether consumers are as optimistic as the company’s management and its auditors about the prospects of these losses being reversed any time soon and these tax losses realizing any value to the company.

Some 27% of the total assets of the company are financed by capital contributions from the Inter-American Development Bank, the Government of Guyana and private customers. GPL is one of the few service providers which can insist that its customers pay for the infrastructure to supply them which the supplier then owns, to share with other consumers as it chooses. Now it is telling those customers that they must prepay for their electricity consumption as well!

The gross amount of receivables from customers is $8.2 billion against which there is a whopping $5.2 billion Provision for Bad Debts or 64%. In other words, for every three dollars owed by customers, the company is confident of receiving only one dollar. Yet, only a couple of weeks ago, the company was boasting in one of its PR moments that the company has achieved a 100% rate of collection. That too makes little sense.

Who are the auditors?
The website financial statements bear an audit report signed by the Auditor General suggesting that he has audited the company’s financial statements. In fact the statements were audited by PKF, Barcellos, Narine & Co. to whom the audit was subcontracted. This is no simple legal technicality of principal and agent and it is entirely incorrect and highly misleading for the Audit Office to make such a misrepresentation. These statements are circulated to a wide group of users who may rely on them for a number of purposes. Unvarnished truth is therefore necessary.

Subject to that, the public would have better been able to understand the numbers if the directors act properly and post on the web the Annual Report as well. That report is ready but responding to my request for a copy, a senior member of the company told me that the report which was presented to the company’s annual general meeting some weeks ago could not be released until it has been authorised by Cabinet! Yet, only recently the company hosted media personnel over dinner and announced the appointment of Mr. Ron Robinson as its public relations consultant. The press persons should have asked about that Report and Mr. Robinson’s first piece of advice to the directors is that the best PR for any service provider is good service, transparency and accountability and that the annual report is a major PR tool. It has taken letters and several calls to the Chairman for me to have a rotting pole at my residence replaced. After about one year a new pole was planted but the old pole is still there, leaning precariously, while my calls to the GM find him always at meetings.

Prepaid meters
Another development announced by the company is the prepaid meter which would require the consumer to pay in advance for the electricity supply s/he receives. This I understand has received support from some quarters of the consumer movement and at least one prominent businessman.

I discussed the matter of prepaid meters with the relevant persons and I believe that they now realise that they may have too readily accepted the company’s arguments about the virtues of the proposed arrangement. One issue that arose during our conversation was whether the proposed arrangement falls within the Standard Terms and Conditions for Electric Service and that any amendments will have to be approved by the Public Utilities Commission.

GPL has touted its proposed move as benefiting customers since the “prepaid metering system … will allow them to manage their consumption of electricity” and that “through the new system consumers will become more knowledgeable about their electricity use and a significant reduction in demand is expected.” If the company truly believes that there will be a significant reduction in demand, one must wonder why the company is bothering to expand its capacity. I was told that the company has told a consumer representative that the system will remove the opportunity for theft! Worse, the person actually believed. The truth is that the company sees its proposed move as helping it to resolve one of its perennial problems – the collection of receivables. If every consumer is required to have prepaid meters, amounting in effect to paying for their supply in advance, the company will collect some $2 billion upfront, interest free, helping it with its cash flow problem.

The company has preferred not to engage the public in any meaningful discussion on the use of such meters but if it had it would no doubt have sought some guidance from South Africa, New Zealand, India, Philippines and Singapore where such a system has been introduced. In South Africa a number of unanticipated problems surfaced and there is universal agreement that the system often militates against the poor, just like VAT does. It is unthinking to assume that electricity can work on identical principles as cell phones and the PUC needs to consider very carefully the conditions under which it will approve any amendments to the regime under which electricity is supplied and paid for.

State of the Art v Common Sense
The company has also announced that it is implementing a US$2.8M automated Customer Information System (CIS) which it claims will boost the accuracy of the cash receipting process, improve customer service by giving prompt responses to billing requests and allow new payments to be immediately credited to a customer’s account. Not only is this an extra-ordinary amount of money for such ordinary benefits but it seems untimely that this is being done when the company is moving to prepaid meters which will reduce the need for as many accounts.

Throwing its own money, or that of its customers or shareholder, behind problems is certainly not the way a modern, large public enterprise should be run. The company is indeed a complex operation but any attempt to solve its myriad problems will first require an examination of its business model. Is it planning sufficiently long in advance and is it taking account of potential developments such as hydro in a couple of years as the President has promised?

I recall my thought in reaction to the announcement about the new software constituting a state of the art billing system. I could not help thinking that what the company needed was nothing state of the art, but simple courtesy and common sense management that does not leave a rotting pole for more than one year or allow losses to keep mounting, year after year.

A review of the Low Carbon Development Strategy – Conclusion

Introduction
Today we conclude our review of the Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) announced by President Jagdeo to the international community and now the subject of consultations taking place across Guyana. The first two parts of this series appeared in these columns on July 19 and July 26 and both before and since that time the reading public have had the benefit of a series of letters on the strategy both supportive and critical of it. More significantly, the Stabroek News has been carrying a ten-part review by Ms Janette Bulkan in which she addresses some of the more technical questions about forest carbon and our own forests about which she is extremely knowledgeable.

Not surprisingly, Ms Bulkan has drawn from a representative of the Guyana Forestry Commission and from the Office of Climate Change set up in the Office of the President strong criticisms, some of which have crossed the line into personal attacks. Ms Bulkan’s contribution has stood out for its scholarship and her responses to the criticisms have been measured and responsible. She and other critics have also been attacked for pointing out the serious weaknesses in the document and for not offering recommendations to improve it. That is regrettable for a number of reasons.

Confusion
One would expect those who are now employed as full-time specialists to recognise from the identified weaknesses the implicit recommendations for improvements. They cannot expect those from the outside to do their work for them. For all the money that is being spent on the LCDS, there seems to be no official voice and the structure of the website hardly fills the breach. As a result one is confused by the ambiguity created by the government’s assurance to the domestic audience that the country will not cede our sovereignty while the highly respected international weekly Economist informs the world that the Guyana President has committed the country to ceding to the world the stewardship of the country’s entire forests by outsiders.

Second, it is often easier to re-write than try to improve a document containing fundamental flaws; third, the government has refused to publish important information relevant to the strategy such as the McKinsey Study on which so much seems to hang, as well as the agreement the President signed with the Prime Minister of Norway which it seems will constitute some kind of model for developed countries to pay rainforest countries for drastically restricting forest operations. And there should be no valid reason for the government’s spokespersons being unwilling to concede the very valid points being made by others, and offering a commitment that these would be incorporated into the final document. Indeed no one is sure – and that seems to extend to the members of the LCDS Steering Committee – of the process for accepting and rejecting the submissions made by others.

Extravagant assumptions
In Part One of this series we said that the success of the LCDS would not be determined in Guyana but by what happens in Copenhagen in December this year, and in the more powerful countries of the world who the strategy expects to pay Guyana as much as US$580M per year for keeping our forests intact as our contribution to fight global warming. This column believes that there will be some money available but nothing on the transformative scale worked out by McKinsey. One has only to look at Exhibit 4 of the strategy which places the projections of expected government revenues for fruits and vegetables within a spread of US$40M–US$110M in 2013, an investment of US$80M–US$100M in 2009 and net exports of US$250M–US$350M after 2011. The estimate for aquaculture products seems even more exotic with a projection of 2013 government revenue of US$150M–US$200M, an investment of between US$135M and US$175M in 2009 and net exports after 2011 of US$500M–US$1,000M after 2011! It borders on the reckless to estimate government revenue in the form of taxation to be 30% of gross revenue, ie before expenses. Whoever did those numbers clearly does not understand our tax culture or the range of tax allowances including export allowances that are available for particular businesses.

I fail to see why anyone would not want to question seriously these projections, and inevitably the value arrived at by McKinsey of US$580M as the value debt owed to Guyana for keeping its forests intact. With Guyana having just 0.5% of the world’s standing forests, that figure which translates to a value of $116,000M, for all the rainforests is a huge sum indeed. No wonder even persons supportive of the LCDS do not believe that Guyana would receive anything like the sums quoted in the document.

And it is that kind of doubt that makes the proposed spending sound a mere wish list. There is nothing in the strategy that indicates how the government will adjust its proposed spending programme if the sums received are less than McKinsey tells us our forests are worth intact. And does the expenditure mean that the government will be engaging in these businesses or giving to particular businesses the money which should be for the country as a whole?

Poor accounting and accountability
As a columnist who has witnessed the bad accounting, misspending and unlawful spending which has become a defining trait of the Jagdeo administration, I shudder at the thought that this or a government with similar tendencies would have control of huge sums of money extracted from international donors to spend as they please. Our under-resourced Audit Office, minimal accountability, gross wastage, unprecedented extravagance, increasing corruption, widespread non-compliance with the financial regulations and poor accountability will hardly impress the international community, and it seems unjust and immoral to ask Norway or any other country to give us money to spend in a manner which their own taxpayers would find completely unacceptable. It is ironic that the LCDS may itself be an example of the absence of accountability. The 2009 Budget had no provision for all the structures, the huge consultancy fees, the costs of travel both locally and abroad being spent on the LCDS, and one has to wonder where the money is coming from (Lotto?) and who is controlling the spending. What we need to accompany any strategy is an accountability strategy that finds favour with our population.

Another reason for doubts about the strategy is that it is not rooted in the culture and habits of this government or in any strong commitment to the environment. For nearly two decades, Asian and Chinese logging companies and local chainsaw operators have been allowed to do almost as they wished with the forests, and efforts to reverse those practices will take time to produce results. The government imports for itself and allows the importation, often duty free, of large numbers of gas-guzzling vehicles; we have unlimited numbers of ministries and departments, no policy on recycling; we tolerate mining practices that are detrimental to the environment and dangerous to some communities and practise not big, but huge government. President Jagdeo most eloquently demonstrated that lack of commitment when he threatened to continue cutting down our forests if the rich countries do not pay up. Blackmail as Plan B can hardly be described as a strategy.
What if the money does not flow?

President Jagdeo is right that we need to protect the environment, but for the wrong reasons. By protecting our forests and our environment we are also protecting our present and future interests. He is also right that we need a strategy to lift the economy from its sub-par performance of below 2% since he became President to a level where the economy provides valuable jobs so that our artisans do not go knocking at the doors of our less-endowed neighbours only to be used and humiliated. He is wrong to believe that such a limited document can provide the blueprint for the economic growth and development of the country.

Guyana does not need a Development Strategy – it has one. Millions of real dollars was spent on versions 1 and 2 of the National Development Strategy (NDS) financed by the Carter Center during the last decade. It brought together the best that Guyana could offer in terms of time and talent and remains a sound document that could drive national development while caring for the environment. It recognised the value of the country’s forests, flora and fauna to eco-tourism which warrant mainly footnotes in the LCDS. It advocated a national forest policy with “guidelines for environmental protection and sustainable resource utilization.” President Jagdeo is half-right when he states that our forests are our most valuable resource – in truth it is the people – but the greatest value of that wealth can be derived if we sustainably manage them. It is not as the President seems to think, all or nothing. The NDS which President Jagdeo praised for its inclusiveness and comprehensiveness has languished largely unimplemented because of his own lack of commitment and attention span.

On the other hand, the LCDS is mainly a document for raising money. As such, it comes with too many shortcomings.

A review of the Low Carbon Development Strategy – Part 2

Introduction
We continue today with part two of the LCDS which President Jagdeo launched on June 8 and which is out for consultation up to the end of September, the timeline driven mainly by the need that it should be ready for the Copenhagen Conference in December of this year. That is when the world will be meeting to discuss a successor to Kyoto, the environmental treaty. The principle of the LCDS is simple enough. Rich countries, the thinking goes, have been destroying the environment at an alarming rate. And in its efforts to meet the demands of its people and not unusually the greed of illegal loggers, developing countries are unwittingly contributing to the impending crisis by the exploitation of their rainforests and eventual deforestation. Time is running out and there are few easy, inexpensive or quick solutions.
Cutting down the forests accounts for 20% of the world’s emission of greenhouse gases. The world then has an interest not only in halting but in reversing the trend of deforestation. To do so would be less expensive and faster than it would be to transform the world’s economies to make them more eco-friendly. In comes REDD – the acronym for “reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation.” The basic outlines of REDD are clear. Rich countries will pay poor ones to keep their forests intact. In return, the rich will get credits that they can put towards their emissions-reduction targets under the proposed new climate treaty.

The promise
That on paper is simple and straightforward enough. As the Economist puts it, rainforest countries are being told “lay down your axe and you will get cash.” But it is far less simple than this or what the Government’s Frequently Asked Questions Booklet (FAQ) makes of it. In fact, that booklet along with the propaganda style of the consultations and public information programmes that are taking place to sell the LCDS do a disservice to the case, leaving serious and fundamental issues unaddressed which might not otherwise cause controversy. Which Guyanese would argue against higher and free revenue inflows, the preservation of our forests that help to protect the iconic Kaieteur Falls or, more mundanely, cheaper electricity? And who would oppose the promise of good governance, reduction of corruption, better delivery of education, health, water and housing?

If the LCDS promises holds true and the McKinsey arithmetic is more realistic than it appears, when the “money starts to flow” we will have the same level of public services, all capable of being financed not by taxes but from rich countries. The government will be able to charge a more honest rate of VAT and a reasonable rate of income tax. Our education system will offer many more QCs and Bishops’ and we will be able to afford a more functional and productive university. It must also be a huge incentive for the Guyanese public to support.

Cynicism
Yet the public has not warmed to the idea and even in areas where there are captive audiences, the average attendance to the consultation is, generously, less than 20. Despite the huge and expensive PR campaign the public is not engaging and is at best cynical. There are concerns about what the country has to give in return, the secret commitments the President has made to the world and the secrecy and apparent conflict between what he tells the world and what he says at home. The LCDS assures us that our sovereignty is not at stake, yet the President has committed the country and future governments to cede to the world the stewardship of the country’s entire forest by outsiders. That is according to the same Economist which has on more than one occasion spoken with admiration of Guyana and the President’s initiative. The consultations need to point out that no government can bind its successors and need to ask about any opt-out clauses under REDD. Would we have to pay back any money we receive as one country has been bound to under a bilateral arrangement, and are there going to be non-financial consequences as well?

The public is cynical too that President Jagdeo is already showing signs that his commitment to the environment is not guaranteed and only this week he issued a threat to continue forestry exploitation unless the rich countries put up the money to pay rainforest countries to keep their forests. The cynicism has been fed too by Mr Jagdeo’s fickle and inconsistent loyalty to strategies.

This is not the first strategy that the President has embraced. He effectively abandoned both versions of the National Development Strategy (NDS) when he realised that a debt-write off strategy was more lucrative and then jumped on the Poverty Reduction Strategy with its promise of more donor funds. Next has come the National Competitiveness Strategy that offers substantial funds from the Millennium Challenge Account sponsored and financed by the United States. Would Jagdeo’s successor – from whichever party – be as committed to the LCDS that he is now single-handedly offering? Or as some cynics see it, is the LCDS the case for a third term?

The LCDS and the NDS
Those who have pulled out their NDS to make comparisons with the LCDS are struck at the comparative absence of detail and the narrowness of the LCDS. By the standard of the NDS, the LCDS is a mini-sector strategy, and it is surprising that none of the 3,000 persons who have attended the consultations has asked about NDS 2 which covers the ten years 2001-10. How committed is the ruling party to the LCDS and does it know and agree with the ceding of control of three-quarters of the country to foreign control?

The LCDS seems extremely short on imagination and ignores any incentives to consumers in preference to investors. Why is there no incentive for solar heating or disincentives for those who contribute in no small measure to the huge fuel bill and non-friendly imports? As one colleague said to me, the owners of the Prados and Tundras that are allowed in daily under duty and tax concessions should give him a credit for driving a small vehicle. The LCDS leans to large-scale agriculture without recognising the role of the small operator or the damaging effect of illegal cross-border operators which is likely to worsen as the road to Brazil makes it easier for those operators to come, do and go as they please. With LCDS milk and honey flowing will Guyanese still have to bear one of the highest tax burdens in the world and would the President finally correct the VAT rate to what it should be?

Seeing REDD
A doubling of any country’s annual budget is not a small matter. The economy and the society can be transformed by simply doing nothing. That must be a huge incentive for any government. Not that that is how the government intends to spend the money. Under the strategy the government will set up new institutions in the Office of the President to drive major low-carbon programme priorities and manage and direct the use of the money coming in under REDD. It is of course hardly reassuring that the money will be placed not in some trust or the Consolidated Fund, but under the watchful eyes of the Office of the President which also currently controls the Lotto Funds in breach of the constitution. Since the President’s embrace of a low carbon economy is a new development, which fund did the money come from to pay McKinsey for its dazzling mathematics to show the worth of our forests? REDD on the other hand is premised on good governance, accountability and transparency which have been endangered by Jagdeo’s disregard for the constitution and the law.

Nor is it clear how the international community putting all this money into Guyana will view the two-tier approach of the LCDS, which provides for the forests under Amerindian control to be an opt-in arrangement. Effectively the country is committed to ceding the vast portion of the country to the international community, but not the Amerindian-controlled forests which that community would be at liberty to manage and/or exploit if it so chooses. While they have a historical and cultural interest in the forests’ preservation, if the Amerindians choose not to be part of the LCDS would they be excluded from LCDS funds or would they get the best of both worlds? And how does Jagdeo’s proposal to deal with LCDS funds fit in with Article 77 of the constitution?

The PPP/C government under President Jagdeo has allowed some Asian operators in the forest sector free rein to extract and export forest products under some of the most glaring transfer-pricing arrangements, with minimal returns to Guyana. Yet, the LCDS cannot be a legally acceptable excuse for breaking a binding agreement as the LCDS seems to assume. The same is true in mining which is probably doing as much immediate harm to the Guyana environment as forestry can do.

Image
Internationally Guyana has established quite a leadership role in forestry preservation due to the Iwokrama project, established under President Hoyte, whose foresight in all of this goes unacknowledged. With President Jagdeo’s promise to the world of what amounts to several more Iwokramas, our international image has been enhanced. But image is not enough. Clout is, and that would have come from the combined efforts of the six or eleven countries with rainforests, depending on definition. Brazil’s is infinitely larger than Guyana’s and surely it would have been to our advantage to team up at least with our neighbour and others in the hemisphere. Assuming there are funds for REDD which would be necessarily limited, criteria for entitlement will have to be established and instead of Guyana and Brazil being on the same side, they may be competing for the same funds.

The difficult questions
Nor is the REDD to be taken for granted, and while there is a recognition that rainforest countries should be rewarded for preserving their forests, the how, the how much, who receives and who pays and whether under a multilateral facility through the UN, or by way of bilateral arrangements as Guyana seems to be working towards with Norway, are still to be decided. Many European countries other than Norway have already entered into arrangements with developing countries. There is Plan Vivo under which donors channel money to Mexico, Mozambique and Uganda to protect forests and plant trees. External inspectors verify the results and issue credits which the UN has chosen not to recognise. Combining these into a ‘Kyoto 2’ will not be easy nor will an agreement be helped by reported corruption in the Office of Climate Change in Papua New Guinea.

Who pays and who benefits are also unresolved questions with one side effectively arguing in Guyana’s favour that those who have a good track record of forest management should be rewarded ahead of those who exploited and now want to re-forest. But the ‘who pays’ is even more controversial. China and India, despite their economies growing at a rapid rate and creating emissions in the process, consider themselves as developing countries and argue that they are not really ready to forgo development for the environment. Why not America? they ask, but America’s own recent climate change legislation shows that while preserving the environment is a universal issue, domestic politics dictate what can be agreed and delivered. And is Canada a special case for its vulnerability arising from the melting of the ice? To crown it all, the conference will be taking place in the year of the world’s worst economic crisis since WW 2.

For me the biggest question mark about the LCDS is its failure to consider a Plan B which hopefully is not the threat that President Jagdeo issued a couple of days ago – let’s continue cutting our forests under the prevailing lopsided arrangements with the Malaysian and Chinese operators who just could not give a damn about Guyana. One thing is for sure: the money he hopes to receive under REDD is several times more than the country currently earns from the sector.

Next week we take a break from the LCDS to cover some topical financial issues and return with a concluding part the following week.

A review of the Low Carbon Development Strategy – Part 1

Introduction
To all Guyanese, from Cabinet to Canal # 1, the announcement that the people of Guyana are willing to act in placing our rainforests under “globally-verified forest and other land use governance standards and transparent, accountable deployment of forest payments” must have come as a great surprise, if not a shock. Under what the government calls a Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS), the economy will take a new direction in which national development and combating climate change are complementary and not competing objectives. The strategy is premised on Guyana receiving huge annual sums from the international community for preserving its forests, sums in excess of what we now pay in taxes and also in the amounts of debt relief we have received in recent years. If the principle is accepted, not here in Guyana but in Copenhagen in December of this year when the United Nations convenes a conference to decide a replacement for the international treaty on the environment called the Kyoto Protocol, and if the strategy is properly implemented by Guyana, the LCDS can have a transformative effect on the country. It would be like the country discovering oil or gold from a non-exhaustible source, to last in perpetuity – economic nirvana. These are major ifs that have hardly been mentioned in all the exchanges witnessed so far in the public debate in Guyana.

Business Page will review the LCDS and engage in a reasoned assessment of the strategy, its perceived benefits, its practicability, weaknesses and chances of success. I will start by setting out and reproducing extensively from the Office of the President’s LCDS Draft for Consultation and its accompanying glossy Frequently Asked Questions, also described as a ‘Draft for Consultation.’ This will be followed by a discussion of the advantages and benefits to Guyana of the strategy, a critique of it and conclude with this columnist’s own views and recommendations. The series will try to avoid the unquestioning, simplistic and naïve attitude of those who are captivated by romantic notions about our forests or taken in by the consultations and commitments by President Jagdeo. Equally, it will avoid the dismissive reaction of those who decide that the messenger (President Jagdeo) could not in any circumstances deliver a good message. We will consider too whether and what the Plan B is or ought to be if Copenhagen does not accept or undertake to finance the fundamental assumptions and effect of the LCDS.

Background
Guyana is fortunate that it is one of the world’s last remaining rainforests with almost 80% of our territory still in its pristine state. This pleasant situation is the result of a combination of factors including the nature of our forests that does not allow for the extensive felling of trees, the preservation of the forests by our First People, mostly strong forest management by the regulator going back to fifty years and more, and the objection to the practices by some operators that generated the collective abhorrence of Guyanese of the exploitative practices of some of the recent entrants into the forestry sector.

According to the consultation document, Guyana’s pristine forests are its most valuable asset – the majority of its 15 million hectare (58,000 square miles) rainforest being suitable for timber extraction and post-harvest agriculture and estimated to contain significant mineral deposits below its surface. International Consultants, McKinsey & Company, appointed under a contract of which no Guyanese knew until recently, estimates the value of this forest – known as Economic Value to the Nation or EVN – to be the equivalent of an annual payment of US$580 million. According to the Office of the President, generating this EVN, while economically rational for Guyana, would have significant negative consequences for the world. The deforestation that would accompany this development path would reduce the critical environmental services that Guyana’s forests provide to the world – such as bio-diversity, water regulation and carbon sequestration. The draft states that conservative valuations of the Economic Value to the World (EVW) provided by Guyana’s forests suggest that, left standing, they contribute US$40 billion to the global economy each year.

Essentially the LCDS is arguing that since the world benefits by US$40 billion dollars per year from the conservation of our forests, and since to Guyana the annual worth of the forest in economic terms is US$580 million, then the world must pay us that sum. Unfortunately the basis on which the Office of the President has come up with these numbers is only summarised in the consultation draft. A more serious review of those numbers requires those studies being made available to those with the necessary skills to analyse such technical analysis, modelling techniques and econometrics.

Self-interest
But economics is only one of the reasons why Guyana should be willing to play its part in the preservation of its rainforest. Self-interest is another. We are dangerously vulnerable to and conscious of deteriorating and irreversible weather patterns placing us among the high-risk countries threatened by climate change. Much of the population and economic activity in Guyana exist at or below sea-level, and according to the draft, in-land flooding represents a significant and growing risk to investors. Major floods in 2005 were reported to have caused damage equivalent to 60 per cent of GDP.

One of the obvious consequences of climate change which only a handful of eccentrics are still prepared to dispute, is that sea levels will rise and more than likely at a faster rate than had been originally predicted. For example, researchers applying the possible scenarios outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that in 2100 sea levels would be 0.5-1.4m above 1990 levels, much greater than the 9-88cm forecast made by the IPCC itself in its Third Assessment Report, published in 2001. That would be devastating to coastlanders who would have to abandon everything and move scores of miles inland (or out).

The discussion draft notes the increasing global recognition that protecting forests is essential to the fight against climate change – forestry causes about 17% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Adding that the movement from recognising the need for action to actual action continues to be too slow, the discussion draft promotes the LCDS as seeking to provide insights on how to stimulate the creation of a low-deforestation, low-carbon, climate-resilient economy.

Epiphany
Even by his own admission President Jagdeo is a new convert to climate change and global warming and it was only as recently as December 2008 that he seems to have recognised the importance of these issues to Guyana. He has moved fast since then. In February 2009, he and the Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, announced a partnership agreement designed to support a low-carbon strategy that includes employment and investment-creation opportunities in Guyana and sustained efforts to avoid deforestation and forest degradation. The consultation draft refers to a joint statement by the Guyana President and the Norwegian Prime Minister, but that statement has not been released to the public and I could not find it in the website reference in the consultation draft. There hardly seems any compelling reason for that statement not being available on the LCDS website and made available to the public-sector dominated LCDS Steering Committee.

In fact, given the implications for the country of the adoption of the strategy, it would be useful for the several documents referred to in the consultation draft to be made available to the nation. That will contribute enormously to an informed public and meaningful discussion. As we shall see many of the actions to be taken under the strategy would require substantial concessions and valuable incentives which will have to come either from the money received under the international arrangement or from taxation.

The four phases of the LCDS
The proposed LCDS will be introduced in four phases beginning in 2009 and continuing indefinitely. The following are the four phases and the intended Payments to Guyana.

Phase 1 (2009) – No sum indicated but the document refers to interim payments to launch the LCDS and funding for Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV).

Phase 2 (2010 – 2012) – US$60M to US$350M for capacity building, human capital development and the investment required to build a low carbon economy.

Phase 3 (2012 – 2020) – US$350M to US$580M annually for essentially the same purposes in Phase 2 and for payments to avoid deforestation and climate change adaptation.

Phase 4 (2020 and onwards) – Greater than US$580M providing incentives at or above the Economic Value to Guyana.

What the strategy will do
The strategy comes perhaps midway in the National Competitiveness Strategy, promoted by the government as the centrepiece of its medium-term strategy and praised by the private sector for its inclusivity.

The NCS prioritises the modernisation of the four sectors on which our economy has relied for centuries – sugar, rice, forestry, and mining – and identifies five additional sectors with the greatest opportunities for new growth and diversification: nontraditional agriculture, aquaculture, manufacturing, business process outsourcing/information technology, and tourism.

The LCDS has more than just subtle differences with the NCS but these the private sector has so far ignored, at least publicly. Under the LCDS Guyana will:

Invest in strategic low-carbon economic infrastructure, such as a hydro plant at Amaila Falls; improved access to unused, non-forested land; and improved fibre optic bandwidth to facilitate the development of low-carbon business activities.

Nurture investment in high-potential low-carbon sectors, such as fruits and vegetables, aquaculture, and sustainable forestry and wood processing.

Invest in other low-carbon business development opportunities such as business process outsourcing and ecotourism.

Expand access to services and new economic opportunity for indigenous peoples through improved social services (including health and education), low-carbon energy sources, clean water and employment which does not threaten the forest.

Improve services to the broader Guyana citizenry, including improving and expanding job prospects, promoting private sector entrepreneurship, and improving social services with a particular focus on health and education.

Undertakings
To win support for the LCDS, the government is prepared to offer a number of undertakings to enhance operational efficiency, transparency and accountability for the execution of the LCDS. The principal new organisational units and systems include an Office of Climate Change (to coordinate all climate-related activities for the nation), a Low Carbon Strategy Project Management Office (to drive major low-carbon programme priorities), and a Guyana Low-Carbon Finance Authority (to manage forest payments and related investment flows into the country and promote investment efficiency to the benefit of Guyana’s economy). The first two of these will operate within the Office of the President.

And as mentioned in paragraph one, the government says it is prepared to subject the rainforests to globally-verified forest and other land use governance standards and transparent, accountable deployment of forest payments.

Report of the Auditor General 2007: Different year, same mess

No change
The report of the Auditor General on the Public Accounts of the country for 2007 has been tabled in the National Assembly and is now officially available to the taxpaying public and commendably on the Audit Office’s website. The story is no different from that of last year, from that of the year before, or from that of the year before that: late by ten months beyond the statutory deadline; a story of reckless abuse of the public funds; condemnation and threats from the opposition; and the nine-day outrage by the public followed by whatever revelation inevitably comes to light. Let us go back to the report for 2000 which was reviewed in Business Page of May 19, 2002 in the form of an imaginary letter to Mr Stanley Ming, then a member of the Public Accounts Committee which is mandated to review and report on the report. In part, this is what the ‘letter’ said:

“A significant number of bank accounts currently in use, including the Guyana High Commission London Account, as well as non-operational accounts were allowed to be overdrawn by large amounts in contravention of Section 22 of the Financial Administration & Audit Act (FAA). Continues.

“The Consolidated Fund is overdrawn by tens of billions while the sum total of all bank accounts (including the overdrawn balance on the Consolidated Fund but excluding the balances on the bank accounts special projects) reflects a positive balance. Continues.

“The State continues to provide funding annually to several public entities even though they do not comply with their statutory duty to submit audited financial statements. Continues.

“The Contingencies Fund continues to be abused despite repeated negative comments on this practice. Continues.

“Proceeds from the Guyana Lotteries are not being paid over to the Consolidated Fund but are kept in a ‘special bank account’ held at the Central Bank and used to meet public expenditure without parliamentary approval… despite the public commitment given by the President and de facto Minister of Finance that this would be corrected.”

Some change
Some things have changed. The report has been cut down in size – the 2000 report contained 2,120 paragraphs; now it is 557 paragraphs. Government expenditure has jumped from $47 billion in 2000 to $101 billion, or more than double. Reports of corruption no longer make news. There has been a Financial Management and Accountability Act that demands more not less accountability, and an Audit Act that sets greater obligations and higher standards on the Audit Office. Have things got better? I do not think so. Back then, we had a professionally qualified accountant heading the office, now we do not. The independence of the office is now more compromised than it was with Mr Deodat Sharma, Auditor General (ag) reporting that he was summoned for instructions by President Jagdeo, clearly in breach of the constitutional provision that the Audit Office should “not [be] subject to the control or direction of any person or authority.” Egregiously, the wife of the Finance Minister is now in a position to give professional guidance to the Auditor General (ag) by virtue of her position as his qualified assistant.

The administration’s response
Predictably and once again, the Minister of Finance Dr Ashni Singh has criticised the report for not reflecting the comments and responses of the various budget agencies and accounting officers. He cannot be serious. The report is in fact full of such comments, even when they make little sense or are misleading. For example on page 5, the Ministry of Finance’s response to the absence of end of year outcomes required under section 68 of the Fiscal Management and Accountability Act 2003 is that the information was not forthcoming from the ministries, agencies and departments. That obligation falls on the Minister of Finance who has more than an adequate set of sanctions to ensure that he gets the information he needs.

But I suspect that the reason is more political. One of the major variances is the revenue collected from the new VAT and Excise Tax introduced in 2007. A single agency over which the Ministry of Finance exercises controls administers those taxes. More than one of them knows that the reason for the massive surplus is that the VAT rate had been incorrectly calculated, but that despite the early detection of the error, the government persisted in what some may consider a fraud on the nation. This information was around and an independent Audit Office should have done its own assessment and put the findings to the ministry.

Indifference
A constant refrain in the responses is that the Head of the Budget Agency had indicated that this matter was being addressed by the Ministry of Finance; that these were presently engaging the attention of the Ministry of Finance; that the Head of the Budget Agency had indicated that this issue was being addressed by the Minister of Finance; and that the Head of Budget Agency had explained that the administration had since written the Finance Secretary to have this matter rectified and was awaiting a response (they are all in the same building). The state of the audits for entities coming under the Office of the President and for which reports have not been laid in the National Assembly deteriorated, while the excuse by the budget agency that “every effort is being made” to do so was met with a further comment from the Auditor General (ag) calling for “special effort” – at best an apparent form of indifference by the Audit Office. But can society be so indifferent about the failure by the administration to properly account for public funds? Since the Minister would also have been aware that a substantial part of the report is of prior year matters which have not been resolved, his response to the report can only be seen as a political rather than technocratic reaction, confident that all will soon be forgotten.

New GPC again
For all the apparent sound and fury generated by the report, all it does is identify some of the better known examples of gross financial irregularities and improprieties that feed the public’s appetite for scandal. Advances of hundreds of millions of dollars to the New GPC, friends of the President, continue to be made for the company to buy drugs for the Guyana Public Hospital Corporation in breach of the tender procedures. One of GPC’s senior officials sits on the board of the hospital, which also does not maintain proper accounting records so that both the non-receipt of items and their issue cannot be determined. What successive reports have failed to do is cause any change in behaviour by a government whose financial management is repeatedly endorsed by the electorate. Perhaps the President was right when he described segments of the public as financially illiterate.

By now the public is well aware of the breach of the constitution regarding the Lotto funds and one wonders why the report only mentions the amount over a ten-year period rather than the period covered by the audit. The report also does not state that the Lotto money is being spent by a person who has no authority under the law to spend any money. There is no great virtue in repeating the statement that the Lotto funds are not being put into the Consolidated Fund as required by the constitution. It is not that it is being held safely in trust or investments – the money is being spent by President Jagdeo as he pleases.

Tardiness and illegality
Where are the sugar unions in the face of the continuing failure to provide satisfactory evidence of $1.451 billion as deposits held for investments on behalf of the Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Fund, the Sugar Industry Rehabilitation Fund and the Sugar Industry Price Stabilisation Fund, two of which have not been audited for twenty-eight years and the other for eleven years? One of the ironies is that GINA, which is being used to defend the government’s record of financial management is itself in breach of the audit requirement.

The report also highlights a transaction involving Region 6 that smells of illegality including differences in vehicle chassis number and full up-front payment when the contract calls for progress payments. If the Customs officers could be referred to the DPP why not those involved in this purchase? And why has the Guyana Elections Commission not taken action against the “firm” that took 268 cartons of Polaroid film valued at $30.485 million which it has failed to recover from the “firm”?

Value for money
Once again the report announces that a Value-for-Money Unit (VFM) is being set up and after four years we can expect a VFM report. That we had to get assistance from Canada to achieve this is bad enough, but the choice of entity makes the idea into a mockery. I visited the Palms briefly not too long ago, and it was shocking to see the conditions under which the residents are housed and the staff have to work. The laundry, kitchen, sleeping and dining facilities are all in a state of disrepair, strangled for cash and other resources. What the Palms requires is not a Value-for-Money audit, but a money-for-value audit, refurbishment, additional staffing, new equipment for the kitchen and laundry, etc.

Conclusion
The recurrence of the egregious weaknesses and exorbitant losses resulting from poor financial administration and a weakened Audit Office suggests either an unwillingness to deal with the problem or a ‘we-like-it-so’ attitude by the government. Even the superficial enhancements in the Audit Office have to be financed with grants and loans, and in 2007 a second grant was obtained from the IDB to implement certain aspects of the office’s three-year Strategic Plan. Unable to do some of the most basic audit functions, to discharge the office’s obligations under various legislation and to complete the audits of the state entities in a timely manner, the Audit Office is now about to establish a Forensic Audit and Quality Assurance section.

How that will solve the problems that have persisted for more than ten years is anyone’s guess. Meanwhile the Auditor General tells us he cannot be sure about the accounts presented to him for audit by the Ministry of Finance.