Category: Letters to the editor

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The audited financial statements and annual reports were used to analyse NBS

I am pleased to see some new names surfacing in the discussion of topical issues. It suggests that there may yet be persons out there prepared to engage seriously in these issues even if sometimes without a sufficient knowledge or understanding of the facts. I therefore consider it useful to address some of the more salient matters raised by Mr Salim Khan in his letter in the Stabroek News of October 6, 2009 ‘Assessments from critics of NBS are counterproductive.’

1. Mr Khan claims I have a peeve about the NBS, having served as a director of the Society. I grant him an unchallenged right to psychoanalyse my writings and personality.

2. Mr Khan recommended that the facts be checked, although there is no evidence that he himself did so. Not only do I always use the audited financial statements and annual reports of the Society for my periodic analysis but before the most recent Business Page, I wrote the Society’s Director Secretary for a copy of the half-year 2009 financials. He is yet to acknowledge my request. Would Mr Khan please help?

3. With NBS being the only Building Society in the country, Mr Khan may wish to tell readers which industry in which country he is referring to in claiming that “NBS’s financial position is as sound as any in the industry.”

4. Can Mr Khan explain what he means in his letter by a “simplistic portfolio of loans” and whether he thinks that the board was wrong to support the members’ motion at the 69th AGM for a Board Loans Sub-Committee?

5. Is Mr Khan aware that commercial banks are subject to two rules on provisioning against doubtful loans – IAS 39 and Bank of Guyana Supervision Guideline 5, the latter of which does not apply to NBS?

6. If Mr Khan would care to read my reviews of the commercial banks’ annual reports posted at chrisram.net, he would immediately realise that their interest spread is a criticism that I invariably make. Having said that, I wonder if Mr Khan knows the following:

a. That unlike the regulated financial and banking businesses, the NBS does not maintain a non-interest bearing statutory deposit with the Bank of Guyana. If they did, it would easily mean on the basis of NBS’s 2008 financial statements setting aside more than $3 billion dollars as non-income earning assets. By not doing so, NBS can earn, at the average rate of interest it earned on mortgages in 2008, income of $275 million not available to the commercial banks.

b. That the NBS is exempt from corporation taxes and consequently for every $100 net income earned by the Society, the commercial banks paying corporation tax at the rate of 45% would have to earn $180.

c. For those commercial banks approved for lending for low income housing, the ceiling is $3 million per loan while in the case of the NBS it is $12 million.

d. That the NBS pays no property tax which on its 2008 net asset position would amount to approximately $40 million annually.

e. That legislatively, NBS with its emphasis on mortgages and prescribed limits, is precluded from the risks of commercial lending faced by the commercial banks.

7. When stacked up against those realities, it is surprising that the NBS does not report higher surpluses than it currently does.

The reason in my view is the result of the inefficiencies of the monopolistic privileges enjoyed by the NBS under statute, politicised, ineffective and self-serving governance and a board and management that lack the range of skills that a modern financial institution needs in a competitive environment.

8. Mr Khan is the only person I know who speaks as a keen observer but who considers directing business to the competition a virtue. As far as I am aware, the only business the NBS ever directed to competing lending institutions was for temporary, bridge financing during the period when the security for loans was being perfected.

Thereafter, the NBS would grant the loan including such amount as to liquidate the bridge-financing.

I trust that I have clarified and addressed Mr Khan’s issues and look forward to his extending me reciprocal courtesies. I trust too that others, including the directors of the NBS, who make similarly uninformed comments and claims, would be guided accordingly.

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Drivers of presidential vehicles behaved inappropriately

Last Sunday afternoon at around 4.30 I was driving west along Carifesta Avenue, when I heard the approaching sounds of a siren and almost instantaneously was overtaken by four speeding presidential vehicles including the one bearing the presidential crest. Having duly pulled up, I then continued on my way when, just before the traffic lights at Camp and Lamaha Streets, I saw one of the cars with its driver’s door open and the driver under a tree chatting with a young lady.

As if that were not bad enough, as I proceeded along Lamaha Street I saw another of the presidential vehicles veer dangerously towards a man who, as I got closer, I recognised as a mechanic I know by the name ‘Cappie.’ A moment later the driver alighted from his vehicle and approached Cappie threateningly. I stopped and warned the driver against assaulting the man whereupon I was told by the driver of the lead vehicle to go my way. I did not until I was satisfied that no direct harm had been done to the man.

Taking the behaviour of the drivers collectively, I could not help but wonder whether these state-owned, expensive vehicles and their staff may have been returning from a fete. One wonders too whether there is a protocol regarding the conduct of the drivers of the presidential vehicles and at the abuses and lawlessness in the name of the President. For those who pay their taxes and abide by the law such behaviour is an affront to good sense, decency and the rule of law.

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Weaknesses in the self-regulation of the accounting industry have been demonstrated

The acceptance by Mr Chandradat Chintamani, FCCA of a place on the board of Demerara Distillers Limited on the last day of 2008 has highlighted the role of individual accountants and the regulator in ensuring that ethical standards in the accounting profession are maintained.

Mr Chintamani is a member of the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Guyana (ICAG) and the Secretary and point man of its Investigations Committee. That committee took close to five years (April 22, 2004 to December 30, 2008) to adjudicate on a professional complaint against two senior directors of DDL and the company’s auditors over a loan-buy back from troubled Hamilton Bank. The evidence is that the company gained from the transaction US$1.1M or more than G$200M at the then exchange rate of the US to the Guyana dollar. The gist of the complaint was that DDL had failed to account for the gain in its financial statements on which the auditors gave a clean opinion.

As the complainant I provided Mr Chintamani directly with particulars of the buy-back which were not reflected in the company’s financial statements.

What increased the concern over the transaction were the conflicting statements made by two senior officials of the company and their inconsistency with the information provided to Mr Chintamani.

In a letter dated December 1, 2003 the company’s Chairman had stated that “the loan was treated as a creditor and included in current liabilities since it is a line of credit.” For good measure the Chairman added that the net effect of the settlement resulted in no gain or loss to the company.

Two weeks later on December 14, 2003 a different story emerged from an article in the Stabroek News in which then Finance Controller and now General Manager of the company Mr Loris Nathoo reported that “since the transaction happened within the financial year and the loans were short-term the company did not see it necessary to report the matter in its statement” (sic). He was also reported as saying that the 25% discount of US$1.1M reflected “interest and other charges.”

After some considerable silence on the part of the Investigations Committee I received a letter dated December 30, 2008 advising me that “based on documentation examined, the Council [of the ICAG] is convinced that the settlement of the loan with Hamilton Bank Limited was properly accounted for in the financial statements of DDL for the year ended December 31, 2002.” I was therefore confronted with a number of questions:

If according to the company’s Chairman the loan was treated as a creditor (as opposed to loans payable or separate treatment as it is an interest bearing liability) how could the Investigations Committee find that it was properly accounted for?

If the later statement by the Finance Controller is correct and there was no need to report the matter in its financial statements were the Finance Controller and the ICAG referring to two different sets of statements?

Assuming that the ICAG is correct, why did interest payable only increase by $72M from 2002 to 2003 if in fact a gain was set against interest payable in 2002?

Should there not have been a disclosure of a loan transaction involving US$4.673M including the credit being specifically disclosed in note 4 to the financial statements?

Since under the ICAG’s bye-laws the Institute can initiate an investigation without a complaint, what is the burden and standard of proof applied by the Investigations Committee and its own obligations to pursue evidence in relation to any enquiry it carries out?

To resolve these questions I wrote the Secretary of the ICAG on January 19, 2009 asking for a copy of the report done by the Investigations Committee. I have not had a response to my request but learnt unofficially that the report may have been oral which raises some serious questions indeed.

The role of the ICAG as regulator is not only to advance the interest of its members generally but also to ensure the maintenance of high standards of practice and professional conduct by all its members. Vernon Soare, ICAEW Executive Director of Professional Standards on the occasion of the decision of that body to open up its tribunals to the press and the public in 2007 put it this way: “A modern professional body must demonstrate that its processes are objective and in the public interest.”

The conduct of the Investigations Committee and the ICAG in the matter of the complaint against DDL and its auditors clearly did not meet that test but rather demonstrated the serious weaknesses in self-regulation and the failure of the accounting profession in its duty to the public. The reputation of the country is no less determined by the conduct of its politicians than by the integrity of the accounting profession.

From the sequence of events Mr Chintamani must have been engaged in discussions about a seat on DDL’s board even while he bore a duty to participate in an independent investigation into a complaint against leading members of that Board. At a minimum, Mr Chintamani should have disclosed to the Council of the ICAG his impending appointment and the Board of DDL ought to have considered the ethical issue involved in offering a place to Mr Chintamani. The approach to him was improper and distasteful and does a disservice to the entire Board of DDL but in the final analysis it was Mr Chintamani’s duty to refuse. His failure to do so, undermined the investigation and discredits the profession.

Mr Chintamani needs to reconsider his decision and lapse of judgment and do what is necessary to restore some measure of confidence in the profession. The Council of the ICAG must also consider whether in the light of these developments the findings of the Investigations Committee can and should stand. A profession that many see, perhaps unfairly, as part of the tax evasion industry cannot afford to feed any negative perceptions about its leading members and itself.

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The minister responsible for NIS is not the President but the Finance Minister

I applaud the initiatives in Friday’s Stabroek Business for persisting with certain issues that do not seem to receive much attention in the other sections of our newspapers. I must however take issue with the editorial in the Stabroek Business of May 8 in which the writer called on the President “to make clear his personal concerns over the particular transgression” regarding the non-deduction/payment by employers of NIS contributions for their employees.

Such a call is not only ill-informed but is also dangerous. Why do we need the President’s “personal concerns” when the minister responsible for the National Insurance Scheme is the Finance Minister? And the writer must surely know that the Attorney General, who just shifted chair back into Cabinet, can with proper respect for the principle of separation of powers among the arms of the state, raise the concern with the Chancellor.

It is also dangerous because as a paper of record Stabroek News should avoid endorsing the improper but regular practice of having the President interfere in matters completely outside his portfolio. We have seen what a mess he makes even when he speaks of matters within his portfolio, such as the Integrity Commission affair. Let me mention an example of the President speaking on the NIS. In 2007 before I resigned as a member of the NIS Reform Committee I wrote the President asking for particulars supporting an announcement he had made in Berbice that “thousands of persons” were being deprived of their pensions because of the state of the records in the NIS. After several weeks, the list I got back had just over 20 names, and on investigation, many of them did not qualify and were therefore properly denied.

While non-deduction/payment is indeed a problem, the NIS faces real and disastrous consequences from Cabinet’s failure to act on the recommendations contained in the 2001 and 2006 Actuarial Reviews and the unlawful and high-risk investments in Clico and the Berbice Bridge, apparently made under a paper baptised by Cabinet. The Head of Cabinet of course is the President himself, while his chief-of-staff Dr Roger Luncheon is the Chairman of the Board of the NIS.

Finally let me say that the scheme continues to act unlawfully or not act as the law requires with its misguided Ministry of Labour/NIS Memorandum of Cooperation. That seems to be the brainchild of someone who has not read the National Insurance Act or who does not have real work to do. Ironically any otherwise delinquent employer could challenge any action by this “inspectorate team” as being unlawful. Oh, what a mess we make!

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The Insurance (Supplementary Provisions) Bill 2009

I note that the Minister of Finance Dr. Ashni Singh has introduced legislation [The Insurance (Supplementary Provisions) Bill 2009] that will bring the functions of the Commissioner of Insurance (CoI) under the Bank of Guyana (BoG). The Explanatory Memorandum states that the “Bill seeks to pave the way for the Bank of Guyana (not the Commissioner of Insurance) to administer the Insurance Act and for a person nominated by the Bank to be appointed by the Court as judicial manager.” Because it was the first reading of the Bill, the Minister was not required to nor did he otherwise give any reason for this move which is not without considerable significance. Such a move would however have been helpful in alerting parliamentarians and the public of the thinking behind the legislation and directing their minds to the kind of preparation they should begin in order to contribute meaningfully to the progress of the legislation.

The Clico meltdown exposed in a rather dramatic and disastrous fashion some of the weaknesses of the existing legislation and its operations. But it also emphasised the need for a more exhaustive examination by an impartial body of the causes of the debacle and the steps necessary to better regulate the insurance sector and prevent similar failures in the future. Without the benefit of that exercise, I can only rely on my experience of the Insurance Act in relation to audits, revelations about Clico as well as – let’s not forget – the GuyFlag/Fidelity story in offering any opinions. Those suggest that what we need are fundamental changes both to the regulatory framework as well as how it operates. The proposed Bill falls very short.

The only change being made by the Bill is the transfer of responsibility for the supervision of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance from the Commissioner of Insurance to the BoG. This raises the obvious question whether the Minister really believes that that is all that is necessary to fix the system that certainly failed us in the case of Clico and serves us poorly in the case of GuyFlag/Fidelity. One assumes that the Minister would have been kept fully informed by the Commissioner of Insurance that the breaches of key provisions of the Insurance Act by Clico were putting policyholders and depositors at considerable risk. Are those addressed by this Bill? I think not.

There is only one Commonwealth Caribbean country that I know of where the insurance industry is supervised by the Central Bank – Trinidad and Tobago which coincidentally has also had the biggest failure to stakeholders, other than Guyana. In Barbados and Belize the sector is supervised by a Supervisor of Insurance operating under the Ministry of Finance. Jamaica has what I consider to be the best model and one which was recommended in Ram & McRae’s Focus on Budget 2009, i.e. a Financial Services Commission. Under that umbrella can fall responsibility for the supervision of such sectors as insurance, securities, prevention of money-laundering and even the financial institutions. That would allow the central bank to deal with its core objectives, namely “the fostering [of] domestic price stability through the promotion of stable credit and exchange conditions, as well as sound financial intermediation conducive to the growth of the economy of Guyana.”

While the Commissioner of Insurance has had to take responsibility for much of Clico’s regulatory failure, the Bank of Guyana too failed to detect that Clico was engaged in deposit-taking which required Clico to apply to the Bank for a licence under the Financial Institutions Act. In fact the disclosures surrounding financial/quasi financial institutions including Clico, the Hand-in-Hand Trust, the New Building Society and the National Insurance Scheme suggest that the Bank of Guyana has its own problems. To add to its mandate supervision for the insurance sector can compound those problems.

I hope that the Bill is a mere temporary measure until the President’s promised investigation into Clico makes more extensive and meaningful recommendations. I hope we do not have to wait too long.