Category: Legislation

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The constitution continues to be flouted in respect of the presidential assent

In a recent interview on Plain Talk, I asked the Prime Minister in his capacity as Leader of the National Assembly whether he was concerned about bills being passed by the National Assembly and not being assented to within the period (twenty-one days) required by the constitution. This problem first surfaced in a big way in 2006. The Prime Minister estimated these to be “about six.”

I knew that was not correct and visited the Parliament Office on Tuesday January 12, requesting an update on 2009 bills not assented to. I was asked to come back later in the day. After making several attempts to contact the person her supervisor told me that the information could not be made available to me.

In any case it was public knowledge that for 2006 ten bills lapsed because of presidential inaction and from records we maintain at Ram & McRae, I was aware that for 2009 only, twenty-six of forty bills had been published in the Official Gazette. What surprised me not a little is that after my enquiries there appeared a flurry of activities involving “the printers” and I wondered whether there was any mischief afoot, even though the Gazette in which the legislation is published had already had moved on to 2010.

It was a shock, but not a surprise, therefore, to receive this past Wednesday several Extraordinary Gazettes containing legislation that dates back, in some cases, several months.

This information provides clear evidence that the constitution continues to be flouted by the President with the tacit or expressed agreement, or neglect of the National Assembly. And even if we assume that the backdated publication is constitutional and legitimate, that leaves eight bills passed in 2009 by the National Assembly which the President has not dealt with in compliance with the constitution.

The implications are more than academic. To force public servants either directly or indirectly to engage in backdating any documents, let alone the Official Gazette, is to make corruption part of their work. Second, it is dangerous for the President to break the very constitution which he took an oath to uphold. Finally, an Act comes into operation on the date of publication. Those Acts published in predated Gazettes are therefore considered to be of retroactive effect, an equally dangerous issue.

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New anti-money laundering act in place – or is it?

Introduction
After two years before a Special Select Committee, new anti-money laundering legislation was passed by the National Assembly on April 30, 2009 and assented to by the President on August 14, 2009, a gap of close to one hundred days. Given the track record of the President in assenting to legislation presented to him, these dates are relevant. Under Article 170 the President must notify the Parliament within 21 days of the date of presentation to him of the bill any reason for withholding his assent. Logically then if the President is not refusing, he should assent within 21 days. No reason has ever been given for the delay.

Not only is this new legislation more than about the prevention of money laundering – it is also about countering the financing of terrorism. And that is why I think that barring some mini-miracle, this Act will be as little-used as the predecessor Act (the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act 2000) which is now repealed. In a submission I made to the Select Committee I wrote that the bill is an immensely complex piece of legislation covering some one hundred and fifteen sections – it is now one hundred and sixteen – and will require several pieces of supplementary legislation to support it. I did not use the words “to make it work” because given the country’s capacity, I did not consider that the bill if passed in its present form would be enforceable. Our parliamentarians are a stubborn lot who have learnt little from their past experience.

Sun-Tai-Lees
While Guyanese have been told, not without some justification, that the previous anti-money laundering legislation had deficiencies and was short of some important provisions, the new Act simply has too many. And what was it short of? Seizure yes, but just look at the Narcotics Act and see who is caught. In my view, it is not that the former Act was bad but that there was no real effort at making it work. I do not recall a single piece of subsidiary legislation passed under the Act and the hand-picked Director of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) was reported in the Stabroek News of Monday, January 8, 2007 as saying that he did not wish to speak to the media on the work that the FIU was doing.

The new Act is largely imported legislation in which almost fifty sections are concerned with the international fight against terrorism but which completely ignores our domestic circumstances. The New York courts have exposed the huge amounts of narco-money that have been flowing into and out of Guyana by well-known Guyanese, and yet the FIU and other agencies concerned with illegally obtained gains have failed to prosecute even one of the perpetrators over the course of more than five years. Some of the streets and areas in Guyana are as well-known for washing dirty money as Sun-Tai-Lee was renowned for cleaning dirty linen. And some non-bank cambios operate with their own laws and rules of accountability facilitating all forms of laundering including widespread tax evasion. Why did we not use the law as it existed, given that we have had a unit specifically set up to deal with that? And why did the Select Committee not try to find answers to these questions? In fact it seems that the committee was almost entirely dependent on that person who appears to have actively participated in the proceedings of the committee.

Shared responsibilities and cosmetics
The Select Committee met on fifteen occasions under the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance who shares ministerial responsibility for this Act with the Minister of Legal Affairs. At the end of the process, however, the bill remained largely intact with many of the changes being no more than cosmetic. Inserting one word here and another word there is hardly what one would expect from a group of a dozen Members of Parliament working for over two years. With no disrespect meant, many of the changes made to the original draft, were the type that a careful editor or draftsperson makes. It did not need twelve wise persons sitting around for hundreds of hours. A similar, notable precedent was the poorly drafted Value-Added Tax Bill in which the only changes accepted by another Select Committee from the substantial submission by the Private Sector Commission were refinements to inadequate drafting. I would mention too the Companies Act 1991, which has shared responsibility but which has remained almost unchanged despite some glaring deficiencies. One fears a repetition of such inaction.

It seems that in common with everything else, the committee was hampered by political loyalty trumping professional judgment. During my presentation to the Select Committee I could not help but notice the contrast between the openness of the members from the parliamentary opposition and the rigid positions taken by those from the government side. I remember in particular being castigated by one member from the government side for making a comment that he often makes, not only privately but publicly as well, so great is the political spell under which some persons seem to fall. The membership of the Select Committee reflects the proportion of seats in the National Assembly so the views of the members of the PPP/C almost invariably prevail.

Bureaucracy, reporting entities and activities
Section 9 of the legislation gives to the FIU powers and duties, some of which are mandatory and others within its discretion, but even if only some of these were to be carried out with minimum efficiency, it would require a significant bureaucracy and budget which the government may be unwilling or unable to finance. Will we again go begging external donors? Just look at how the government has had the Stock Exchange, the Securities Council and the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance struggling for funds. Why would the government be more serious on money-laundering when political parties in the past were known beneficiaries of laundered and illicit money? In fact when the history of money-laundering in Guyana is written it will be found that political parties and key trade unions were the earliest players in the money laundering game, and there is no reason to suggest that some of that no longer exists.

Under the Act the reporting entities are classified under two broad headings – Financial Institutions and Designated Non-financial Business or Profession. Financial businesses are mainly those engaged in banking and financial business while the second category includes casinos, betting shops and lotteries when their customers engage in financial transactions in excess of $500,000. It includes dealers in precious metals, accountants and attorneys acting in relation to specific activities, trustees etc.

The activities subject to the Act are wide-ranging and include finance leasing, credit unions and advisory services including undertakings on capital structure which is part of the daily fare of attorneys-at-law and accountants. Included as well are cambios, pawn-broking, used cars dealers, exporters and importers of valuable items and dealers in real estate.

Section 18 of the Act places an obligation on reporting entities to pay special attention to suspicious transactions and to report promptly such transactions to the FIU. Which cambio dealer would feel safe that he can report an approach from one of our drug lords or which pawnbroker would have the resources to set up the mechanism for detecting suspicious transactions?

It seems that the only people who have taken the prevention of money-laundering seriously are the financial institutions. Only today I asked a prominent real estate agent how he was coping with the Act. His response was a blank stare. I have no doubt that the same would be true of many pawnbrokers, accountants and lawyers. And why should we believe that accountants who help their clients to duck income from the taxman would report his clients to the Financial Intelligence Unit? And is it likely to be any different with the lawyer who manufactures documents for the benefit of his client? It is time for us to get real.

Conclusion
One of my biggest concerns about the Act is that its architects consider that the FIU is a role which can be carried out by a single person operating with an accountant, (it is not stated whether this is required to have a professional qualification) and an attorney at law along with one support staff member. I am aware that the Barbados model was commended to the committee but obviously ignoring any fears about corruption it has decided not to follow the Barbados model which has at the supervisory level a Anti-Money Laundering Authority comprising the Commissioner of Police, the heads of Income Tax and Customs, the Supervisor of Insurance, the Registrar of Corporate Affairs and representatives of the Governor of the Central Bank and the Solicitor General. This is clearly not a function which should be placed under a single person accountable to a minister. It may be particularly helpful to examine the Barbados model.

One serious weakness in the Act is that it does not appear to require the investigation of the source of funds of “foreign investors” some of whom are engaged in the international laundering of money.

The Act has been passed but it is practically useless without the necessary regulations for the various sectors and activities it covers. Until these are done, except for the financial institutions, there is really a gap – albeit temporary – in anti-money laundering activities. It is remarkable but during the past year there has been growing evidence of massive money laundering. Until we get serious the launderers are having a field day.

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The Insurance (Supplementary Provisions) Bill 2009

I note that the Minister of Finance Dr. Ashni Singh has introduced legislation [The Insurance (Supplementary Provisions) Bill 2009] that will bring the functions of the Commissioner of Insurance (CoI) under the Bank of Guyana (BoG). The Explanatory Memorandum states that the “Bill seeks to pave the way for the Bank of Guyana (not the Commissioner of Insurance) to administer the Insurance Act and for a person nominated by the Bank to be appointed by the Court as judicial manager.” Because it was the first reading of the Bill, the Minister was not required to nor did he otherwise give any reason for this move which is not without considerable significance. Such a move would however have been helpful in alerting parliamentarians and the public of the thinking behind the legislation and directing their minds to the kind of preparation they should begin in order to contribute meaningfully to the progress of the legislation.

The Clico meltdown exposed in a rather dramatic and disastrous fashion some of the weaknesses of the existing legislation and its operations. But it also emphasised the need for a more exhaustive examination by an impartial body of the causes of the debacle and the steps necessary to better regulate the insurance sector and prevent similar failures in the future. Without the benefit of that exercise, I can only rely on my experience of the Insurance Act in relation to audits, revelations about Clico as well as – let’s not forget – the GuyFlag/Fidelity story in offering any opinions. Those suggest that what we need are fundamental changes both to the regulatory framework as well as how it operates. The proposed Bill falls very short.

The only change being made by the Bill is the transfer of responsibility for the supervision of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance from the Commissioner of Insurance to the BoG. This raises the obvious question whether the Minister really believes that that is all that is necessary to fix the system that certainly failed us in the case of Clico and serves us poorly in the case of GuyFlag/Fidelity. One assumes that the Minister would have been kept fully informed by the Commissioner of Insurance that the breaches of key provisions of the Insurance Act by Clico were putting policyholders and depositors at considerable risk. Are those addressed by this Bill? I think not.

There is only one Commonwealth Caribbean country that I know of where the insurance industry is supervised by the Central Bank – Trinidad and Tobago which coincidentally has also had the biggest failure to stakeholders, other than Guyana. In Barbados and Belize the sector is supervised by a Supervisor of Insurance operating under the Ministry of Finance. Jamaica has what I consider to be the best model and one which was recommended in Ram & McRae’s Focus on Budget 2009, i.e. a Financial Services Commission. Under that umbrella can fall responsibility for the supervision of such sectors as insurance, securities, prevention of money-laundering and even the financial institutions. That would allow the central bank to deal with its core objectives, namely “the fostering [of] domestic price stability through the promotion of stable credit and exchange conditions, as well as sound financial intermediation conducive to the growth of the economy of Guyana.”

While the Commissioner of Insurance has had to take responsibility for much of Clico’s regulatory failure, the Bank of Guyana too failed to detect that Clico was engaged in deposit-taking which required Clico to apply to the Bank for a licence under the Financial Institutions Act. In fact the disclosures surrounding financial/quasi financial institutions including Clico, the Hand-in-Hand Trust, the New Building Society and the National Insurance Scheme suggest that the Bank of Guyana has its own problems. To add to its mandate supervision for the insurance sector can compound those problems.

I hope that the Bill is a mere temporary measure until the President’s promised investigation into Clico makes more extensive and meaningful recommendations. I hope we do not have to wait too long.

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Clico, contagion, containment and concealment

If a loss of public moneys should occur and, at the time of that loss, a Minister or official has caused or contributed to that loss through misconduct or through deliberate or serious disregard of reasonable standards of care, that Minister or official shall be personally liable to the Government for the amount of the loss.

Introduction
This is a direct quote from section 49 of the Fiscal Management and Accountability Act which President Jagdeo signed into law in late December 2003. The Clico affair and related matters may be a good time to draw attention to the provision which has never been tested at the higher levels. When the dust settles, the taxpayers, NIS contributors and beneficiaries, members of pension and medical schemes and depositors in Clico and potentially in Hand-in-Hand Trust (HIHT) and the New Building Society could lose collectively several billions from the fall-out in the financial sector.

Other consequences will be equally severe, if not always as direct. Jobs will have to go. Moreover, with perhaps billions invested in Stanford Investment Bank (Stanford) by the HIHT and other so far unidentified pension schemes and individuals, their losses and their income stream − all in US dollars – will be gone. With the assertion that our economy is ring-fenced having proved naively misleading, and claims by Clico, the President, the Minister of Finance and the Commissioner of Insurance − all acknowledged as very bright persons − having proved to have been misguided at best and been guilty of misrepresentations at worst, there is a loss of confidence not only in the judgment and competence of our economic managers, but also in the independence and ability of the regulators to protect the public interest.

Last Wednesday, Ms Maria van Beek, the Commissioner of Insurance, presented a petition to the court seeking an order that Clico be wound up or alternatively, that a Judicial Manager be appointed. One day later, Ms van Beek was granted her wish by Chief Justice Ian Chang in an order returnable tomorrow, Monday, appointing her as Judicial Manager of the entity which she has supervised for more than five years. Instead of immediately issuing a statement advising affected persons – numbering tens of thousands – of the implications that flow from the order, Ms van Beek proceeded to the Office of the President for a press conference, where along with the Minister of Finance Dr Ashni Singh and the Governor of the Bank of Guyana (the Bank) Mr Lawrence Williams, she sat silently as the President made excuse after excuse for the failure of Clico and gave vague statements about protecting pensioners without once using the G word – guarantee − which is what people, worried about their savings, pensions, medical schemes and jobs most need.

Blame The Bahamas
President Jagdeo, who is not the responsible Minister, told the nation that it was the collapse of Clico Bahamas that triggered the action by the commissioner. Yet that is not what the commissioner said in an affidavit sworn to the court one day earlier. She said it was the business model and investment policies pursued by the company. The President, seeking to protect Ms van Beek and by extension his Minister of Finance, told the nation that the commissioner had told Clico more than one year ago that they should have regularised their investment position. So, did the commissioner write the company and then sit back as they breached the law even further? The problem with the President’s style of intervention is that at best, he does not check the accuracy and implications of the statements he makes and increasingly often, he is wrong. There is no need to remind anyone of the damage caused by such lack of respect for accuracy as we saw in the saga of tax concessions necessitating an amendment in the law to facilitate Queens Atlantic Investment Inc’s tax concessions.

In matters financial details are important and so is judgment, particularly when it involves self-serving statements. When the President assured the nation on February 5 that Clico’s assets were sufficient to meet its liabilities he was repeating a company line without having read the December 31, 2007 analysis showing that 81% of the company’s assets was invested in related parties, all of which were under various degrees of threat (SN February 7 and Business Page Feb 8 reported on this analysis). In fact as Minister-Extraordinaire he should have known that the 2008 figures had shown some deterioration, suggesting that the commissioner’s call was ineffective and/or ignored. Both he and the Minister of Finance should have wondered how a company that issued “insurance policies” with premiums running into billions of dollars only needed a statutory fund of under fifty million dollars.

Disregard for reasonable care
The disregard for reasonable care does not end with them. The nation would have expected the Commissioner of Insurance and the Bank of Guyana to recognise that those policies were investment products dressed up as insurance. It is hard to believe that such a major issue would have escaped the attention of the Bank with illustrious directors of the calibre of Drs Gobin Ganga, Prem Misir and Cyril Solomon.

Given the poor oversight exercised by the regulators in general and the Commissioner of Insurance in particular, the court would have been reluctant to appoint Ms Van Beek to manage the operations of Clico under its supervision. Her demonstrable failures to act expose her inappropriateness for such a job, or even to have been the lead regulator for an industry which also required legal expertise. The problem for the court is that the law appears to have given it little choice. Yes, the court could have made a winding up order on the ground that Clico is insolvent, and use the more practical test of “inability to pay one’s debt on demand” that may very well have been the case. But the Insurance Act makes it a bit more difficult for the court by requiring a determination of the value of a troubled company’s assets and liabilities, never an easy task even for accountants. The President compounded the difficulty by volunteering that he hoped that the entire sum from The Bahamas company would be recovered even as he failed to address the billion dollar debt owed by CRL, the Guyana forestry product subsidiary of the troubled CL Financial which has guaranteed the debt.

Once the court chose not to go with the winding-up option – though this may still happen at some time – section 68 of the act gave it no choice but to appoint the commissioner as the Judicial Manager. Apart from the fact that her past supervision of Clico inspires little confidence, and her inattention to detail was embarrassingly exposed when she wrongly identified the name of Clico in her petition, what then becomes of her statutory role and function as Commissioner of Insurance over Clico and the rest of the industry, including Fidelity, which would ordinarily require full-time attention? Additionally, there appears to be a conflict between her two roles which the court would have to consider given that the court itself is not equipped to make business judgments.

NIS
The poor NIS could stand to lose six billion dollars in investments in Clico which may not have been made in compliance with the NIS Act. This is no small change. It is the equivalent of more than 20% of earnings accumulated over forty years by the Scheme and about one year’s benefits payment. To check on the propriety of the investments, I wrote Minister of Finance Dr Ashni Singh a letter on February 24, pointing out that the NIS Act only allows the NIS to invest in securities approved of by the Co-operative Finance Administration (COFA) established under the Co-operative Financial Institutions. I pointed out that he is not only the Chairman of COFA but as Minister, appoints the Board of COFA. The Minister of course also appoints the Board of the NIS. I asked him the following questions:

1. The names of the persons he appointed to COFA currently serving as members of the administration, and the commencement and termination dates of their appointments.

2. The securities which COFA approved for purposes of investment.

3. Whether the NIS had sought and received approval for any investments other than those determined by the administration and if so, the securities which have been so approved.

4. Whether the administration during his tenure as Minister has ever taken the opportunity under section 4 of the act for its Chairman or Secretary to attend any meeting of the National Insurance Board, and in particular the meeting at which any decision was made by the board for any special investments.

I am awaiting his response. But if it were owing to the Minister’s “misconduct or through deliberate or serious disregard of reasonable standards of care” COFA did not approve of NIS investing in Clico the Minister would have some serious questions to answer, not to Business Page but to the nation.

To make matters worse for the NIS, Clico was allowed, even while Commissioner van Beek, the Minister of Finance, the President and the Bank of Guyana were “monitoring” the imperilled insurance company, to divest itself of $1.5 billion dollars of bonds in the Berbice Bridge Company Inc. The Board of the NIS, all the members of which are either ducking or hiding, needs to explain to the nation whether the terms of their $6 billion investment in Clico were breached by the sale of the bonds and whether the Scheme feels that its investment is any safer now.

The New Building Society
More than ten years after privately as a director of NBS and publicly as a columnist, I advocated that the country’s only building society with more than one hundred thousand persons’ savings and loans involved be brought under the supervision of the Bank of Guyana, the Bank exercises no jurisdiction over the NBS. During that time the government has drastically increased the lending limits while relaxing the conditions and security required to back the loans made. One only has to consider the Savings and Loans crisis in the US in the late eighties to appreciate the possible consequences of such laxity. But there is more to worry about. The board has also become increasingly politicized with its current Chairman being Head of the Public Service in the Office of the President and the decision about the new Head Office involving hundreds of millions of dollars being made against technical professional advice. Quietly, the NBS has been joined in the failed attempt to prevent the demise of Clico. The NBS has bought over $1.5 billion dollars of bonds in the Berbice Bridge Company Inc from Clico, and it is unlikely that this would have happened without the official agreement and sanction of the Office of the President in which both the Chairman of the NIS and the Chairman and one director of the NBS are based, or the Ministry of Finance which has to approve investment in securities issued by the Berbice Bridge Company.

The danger is obvious. The NBS with assets in excess of $30 billion is unsupervised and unregulated but subject to powerful political influences. If the bridge company which is proving the sceptics right about the hugely optimistic traffic projections, and the board, which is chaired by the Clico CEO, cannot meet its financial obligations to bondholders, $1.8 billion of the funds of the NBS – representing about 40% of its reserves – would be at risk. That is real money which added to the Head Office being constructed at a cost of approximately $800 million could pose real trouble for the society.

Once again the recurring players are the President, the Minister of Finance and the Bank of Guyana, the last-named of which has failed to assume any jurisdiction as it should have. Of course this in no way exonerates the Chairman and directors of the NBS from their fiduciary obligations.

Hand-in-Hand Trust
The President also referred at the press conference to the investments made in Stanford by the Hand-in-Hand Trust, which holds depositors’ funds and manages some of the country’s largest pension schemes. He said that in the case of the HIHT, “total current exposure” to the Stanford Group amounts to $827 million or US$4 million, in addition to $297 million or US$1.5 million invested on behalf of pension funds. He then went on to confuse the nation by referring to the direct exposure which he said represented 9 per cent of the total assets of HIHT.” Whether it is 9% or closer to 10% is less important than the fact that this is not how one measures exposure. With the head of the Bank of Guyana and the Minister of Finance sitting in at the press conference as his technical advisors, the President as an economist should know that the measure should have been total exposure of the company – direct and indirect – relative not against total assets which do not belong to the company but only to equity which does. In other words he was downplaying the problem in more than one way.

The question has also been raised whether it was permissible for the HIHT, regulated by the Bank of Guyana under the Financial Institutions Act, to place so much of its funds in a single investment – what lay persons would refer to as putting too many eggs in one basket, but which the more technically-minded Bank of Guyana would call asset concentration. In the case of the failed Globe Trust, the Bank of Guyana received more than a mild criticism from then Chief Justice Carl Singh for its poor oversight. It must now hope that by some miracle the investment by HIHT in Stanford will be recovered. If that does not happen, then the Bank can expect not only a strong rebuke but perhaps even a lawsuit.

Conclusion
Faced with a financial crisis, the first step is containment. Instead we had concealment with the consequence that it has widened and enlarged now including, with potential negative and costly consequences, the National Insurance Scheme, the New Building Society, pension schemes and savings accounts of hundreds of thousands. Confidence is also crucial but this comes only from the competence, judgement and independence of our leaders and regulators. None of these qualities has been adequately demonstrated in this instance by the President, the Minister of Finance, the Commissioner of Insurance, the Bank of Guyana, the National Insurance Scheme and the New Building Society.

The rest of the financial sector and perhaps with one exception the insurance sector all appear very solid. Every effort must be made not to contaminate them and to restore confidence in the entire system. I believe that the National Assembly needs to take an active role in this.

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Most of major issues were avoided

Dr Misir avoided most of the major issues raised by me in the exchange of letters I have had with him over the past couple of weeks, while my hint to him that he should be guided by Eleanor Roosevelt’s classic quote about ideas, events and people appears to have escaped him in his letter of February 17 (‘Excessive nitpicking,’ SN).

Dr Misir and his fellow team member Mr Kwame McCoy in particular, seem fascinated by my politics. Fortunately or unfortunately, I have no tale to tell of personal heroism, revolutionary activism or political association to whet the appetite of Dr Misir and his “huge team of… significant players,” all serving a political cause paid for by taxpayers which would make the Value-For-Money practitioner recoil in horror and despair. For the information of Dr Misir and Mr McCoy my major contact with the PNC of the PPP’s critical support days was having been part of the group including Lou Bone, Eddie Dewar, Valerie Holder, Clairmont Kirton and Freddie Kissoon whom Burnham had decreed should get no work from the state. At no time during the PNC regime was I ever employed by or received any work from the state. Indeed, during that period I was close to the WPA, NAACIE and FITUG – hardly associations that would appeal to the PNC. There were people, some now feeding at the trough of the PPP government, who were strongly pro-PNC or anti-PPP then. But those are personal choices for which each must be respectively responsible. I offer no judgmental view of them.

Since Dr Misir seems determined to avoid or devalue any discussion such as his citing Ms Gail Texeira’s “observations” in a newspaper article as his constitutional authority on the propriety of presidential actions; or using the excuse of the accomplice and joint offender (the Ministry of Finance) as justification for the misuse of the Lotto Funds by the President and improper accounting therefor by the Ministry of Finance; and since Dr Misir seems more interested in personalities than in facts, issues and shortcomings affecting our society, I consider that any further engagement or exchange with him will serve no useful purpose and will be an imposition on readers.

If, however, Dr Misir would like some real and serious discussion on such issues as the constitutional right to information, a long term economic strategy for the country, electocracy versus democracy, politicisation of the public sector and campaign financing reform, I am sure there are many who would like to engage him. The ball is now in his court – but then he claims to be a batsman, not a tennis player.