Stanford 20/20 smoke and mirrors and an update on Clico

Introduction
The columns of Business Page have reported on far more financial scandals than it would have liked. Although it was soon overtaken as the biggest corporate scandal ever, Enron was covered in a series in February 2002 and remembered in a piece one year later to mark its anniversary. Parmalat too with a hole of billions on its balance sheet and Nick Leeson who brought down the 233-year-old Barings Bank, the Queen’s bank, were accorded their fair share of space. More recently it was Bernard Madoff of the US and B. Ramalinga Raju of Satyam Computer Ltd of India to add to the list of corporate fraudsters. Each fraud has had its own consequences, with Enron taking down with it Arthur Andersen, one of the world’s most respected accounting firms, as well as the investments of its employees’ pension scheme.

For the most part however the direct consequences have been felt by employees, creditors and shareholders, including pension schemes. And they have all had some common ingredients − a tale of lies, deception, smoke and mirrors, sleeping accountants and poor governance and weak regulators, all fed by frenzied greed in the name of capitalism. Each, however, took place in larger economies that could absorb a moderate level of stress and setbacks.

‘Sticky Wicket’
On the other hand, the fall from grace of cricket icon Sir Allen Stanford is in a different ballpark altogether. After the government, the Stanford group is/was the largest employer in its home base Antigua. It has its own cricket ground – named appropriately Sticky Wicket − with swimming pool, lighting and facilities that rival the government-owned stadium and the record-making Antigua Recreation Ground. It operates the Bank of Antigua which has a significant share of the retail banking in that country. It owns some of the choicest pieces of real estate on the island. It was, prior to its fall, planning to develop an area called Shell Beach and nearby Maiden Island, towards the end of the airport runway, with a marina, shopping and entertainment complex.

Stanford’s towering image, cosy relationship, influence and hold over Antigua simply cannot be under-estimated. The island’s Prime Minister, Baldwin Spencer, never a friend of Stanford, admitted that the charges brought by the SEC against Mr Stanford and two of his associates could have “catastrophic” consequences. He urged the public not to panic. It was like telling persons in a rainstorm not to take protective action – and such advice was quietly ignored by depositors who queued up to withdraw their money from the Stanford-owned Bank of Antigua. Seizing the political opportunity to crush Lester Bird, he has called general elections which he is certain to win.

Threat
There is also a wider, regional threat to the Eastern Caribbean Dollar – one of the most stable currencies in the world and which is managed by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, the monetary authority for eight OECS island economies including Antigua. The bank in a statement reportedly handed to people queuing to get their money said its “liquidity position is sound.” It was careful to note however that that the bank’s ability to meet customer requirements applied “under normal circumstances” and that if individuals persisted in rushing to the bank in a panic, they would precipitate a collapse. The consequences of massive withdrawals and conversion into and flight of foreign currency is going to test the stability of the EC dollar over the coming weeks.

But the image Mr Stanford cultivated was even bigger than the assets or his plans. For example, the helicopter in which he landed at Lord’s to announce his “20/20 for 20 million” deal with the England and Wales Cricket Board was not, as the gold-plated Stanford name and logo emblem on its body indicated, corporate property but one rented for the day. Nor was the $20 million jackpot in the treasure chest shown to the world at the launch real money – it was at most about US$100,000 standing atop wads and wads of paper. It was one big con. The press, fascinated by the Texan billionaire, was too dazzled by the dollars to see the game at work and to ask questions.

Dazzled by wealth and….
Stanford was flamboyant, ambitious and most importantly for the gullible, including most of the region, fabulously rich. But contrary to his tale of a family heritage and inheritance associated with Stanford University, Stanford’s real wealth had its source in the early 1980s when he and his father James Stanford bought distressed properties in Texas during the oil industry bust and the S&L crisis, rehabilitated them and sold them at huge profits when the market got better.

But Texas was too big for the man who had visions of grandeur and royalty. He wanted to be king and chose first Montserrat to base his operations before moving to Antigua where he became a real force during the rule of the Bird family, the father-and-son dynasty that held power for more than 40 years. It was during that period that Stanford helped the Birds turn Antigua into a tax haven and soon made him into a billionaire. With his personal wealth estimated at more than US$2 billion, he was bigger than the economy of Antigua and so Stanford could get whatever Stanford wanted. He demanded and received the trappings of royalty that Texas could not give him – a knighthood without the need to bow in front of the Queen. In fact that knighthood was granted to him by the Birds. He ran his financial empire from the island’s airport office park which was the most iconic landmark to greet any visitor to the island. While his empire extended to Latin America his colossal status derived from his tryst with West Indian cricket of which he was seen as the saviour following years of the most pathetic management by a succession of the most pathetic Board of Directors ever to have ruled the game anywhere in the world. With the glitter of millions, he redefined West Indian cricket into a game of fast paced entertainment, money and image, particularly appealing to the lucrative television market.

Criminal charges likely
The details of Stanford’s fall are still unfolding but what seems to have emerged so far is that the company was selling investors high-yielding certificates of deposit on the basis they were safe and liquid investments. According to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Stanford’s investment portfolio was an opaque “black box,” including holdings in illiquid real estate and private equity. Following investigations that had been going on since last summer, the SEC has filed charges against three entities, Antigua-based Stanford International Bank, and its affiliated Houston-based investment advisers, Stanford Group Company and Stanford Capital Management.

Unlike Kenneth Lay or Madoff or Raju, Stanford has not been charged with any criminal offence – at least not yet. The action brought against Stanford is a civil action although the word fraud has been used by the SEC involving somewhere between $8 and $9.2 billion. It has been reported that the FBI is carrying out its own investigations but that it does not want to lay charges until it has been able to find sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Should it move too early it will have set in train a schedule that would force criminal investigators to charge, indict and construct a trial within a tight time-frame. Whether it is criminal or civil fraud is the kind of fine distinction that does not interest depositors and investors who have been rushing to all locations where Stanford operates demanding the return of their money.

Impact
It has been reported that some of our cricketers have invested money in Stanford while the Ministry of Finance has confirmed that one major institutional investor, which Business Page suspects is either a commercial bank or an insurance company, has placed funds with the Stanford group. The Ministry has told the press that it is “monitoring the situation” although quite what this means in the light of its handling of the Clico issue is hardly reassuring. We must not forget that there are thousands of Guyanese living in Antigua and it is a fair guess that many of them would have had their savings in Stanford’s bank. If the government is truly monitoring the situation it should immediately send a high-level representative to Antigua to represent the interest of those persons.

At some time we will have to confront the threats to small countries by rich investors and oligarchs who can bribe, cajole and threaten to get what they want. The view that these people are here to save us must by now be surely mistaken. So too is the view that we are insulated from the world economic crisis. Our own politicians need to stop feeding us with their own form of garbage.

Clico update
Chairman of the National Insurance Scheme has told the press, more than a month after the news of the failure of Clico Investment Bank in Trinidad and Tobago that he is uncertain about the extent of the exposure of the NIS to the local Clico company. That is amazing and dangerous when in the same breath he estimates that the exposure can be as much as $6 billion.

Business Page has for two weeks been trying to obtain confirmation from various members of the NIS Investment Committee of the value of the exposure and has written to the acting General Manager of the Scheme seeking confirmation. By arrangement the Commissioner of Insurance has also been written to with a list of several questions the answers to which would form the basis of next week’s Business Page. If Dr Luncheon is right and the exposure is around $6 billion, then potentially we could have some really serious problems since the Scheme’s viability will depend on the continued success of Clico Guyana. The consequences of a failure are simply too frightening to contemplate.

Insurance Commissioner should be addressing the public on Clico

Ms. Maria van Beek expressed surprise (SN letter of February 14, 2009) at what she describes as Business Page’s unspecified “assertions and suppositions” (February 8, 2009) on the role of her Office in the Clico issue. She claims that I did not seek her comments on it. She is wrong on both counts.

What did Business Page say about her Office? That it has been silent on the Clico issue (fact then and now); that it is very important for her Office to ask the right questions and to get hard information from the company (vital then, more so now); that the responsibility for supervising Clico’s operations falls entirely under the Commissioner of Insurance (is she disputing that?); that her Office should have been far more proactive than it has been in this matter (is that not a given?) and that the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance simply does not have the resources to properly regulate the sector (fact, just visit her room at the Privatisation Unit in Barrack Street).

But let us set the records straight. When I returned to Guyana on Friday, February 6th, to begin our firm’s preparation for the Budget 2009, I drove straight to Ms. van Beek’s office hoping to meet her in connection with Clico. She was not in office but her secretary spoke to her in my presence. She did not however call me until days later, after the column on Clico had appeared. To say therefore that I did not seek her comments is misleading for someone who regulates an industry subject to the principle of “utmost good faith”. I even had to do some special arm-twisting to get a copy of the 2007 annual report of Clico for which I had to pay her Office $5,400, at the prohibitive charge of $100 per photocopied page.

Almost as if there is nothing unusual about the Clico issue, Ms. van Beek expressed satisfaction that insurance companies have been addressed in BP, adding that she hoped that “this examination of an insurance company’s financials is one of many more to come.” There is no room for banality when $7.5 billion of people’s money in Clico is invested in related parties owned by the CL Financial Group, Clico’s parent which is facing serious liquidity and other difficulties. But yes, Ms. van Beek, just send me the financials and I will review them. Her office should be doing the same and providing informed periodic reports for the benefit of the public.

Too many public bodies are more concerned with protecting their image than in carrying out their mandate. Now that the Governor of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago is claiming that the situation with the Trinidad group is more serious than first thought, Ms. van Beek should be addressing the public on the substantive issue instead of making small and wrong points about Business Page.

I appreciate Ms. van Beek’s offer of assistance and will be writing her for information to do a follow-up to the February 8 article.

Addressing the CLICO Issue

Introduction
Rumours that the region’s largest conglomerate CL Financial Limited (CL) was experiencing difficulties were confirmed at a dramatic press conference in Trinidad two Fridays ago, hosted by the Governor of the Central Bank and including CL’s chairman Lawrence Duprey and Finance Minister Karen Nunez-Tesheira. At the press conference it was announced that the group, better known by its founding acronym CLICO, had approached the Government of Trinidad and Tobago for a line of credit to meet some unusually large demands for withdrawals from CLICO Investment Bank (CIB), a subsidiary of CL.

The initial deal seemed clean, clinical and simple enough. The government and the central bank would take control of CLICO Investment Bank (CIB) while the assets and liabilities of CIB and another subsidiary, Caribbean Money Market Brokers (CMMB) would be transferred to state bank First Citizens. At the same time the Minister of Finance announced that the government and the central bank would guarantee the assets of depositors and policy holders at CLICO, CLICO Investment Bank (CIB), CMMB and British American Insurance by the injection of cash. In return CL was expected to give up vast swathes of its empire including its 55 per cent stake in Republic Bank Ltd (worth billions of dollars), its interest in Methanol Holdings Trinidad Ltd, which owns and operates the world’s largest methanol plant, and share its equity interest in CLICO and British American Insurance.

Jitters and praise
The government and the central bank were praised by the TT business community for their prompt and mature response and jitters appeared calmed. But things turned a bit sour when the government sought to pass necessary legislation to provide it with the remaining powers needed to extend supervision over insurance companies and to facilitate the transaction. The country’s Opposition Leader accused the government of having engaged in a hostile takeover; the press revealed that both the central bank Governor and the Minister of Finance had been connected with cashing out of deposits with CIB; Mr Duprey brought in UK Senior Counsel to advise him on the transaction while the government brought in financial specialists to assist in the valuation of the assets and in the restructuring of the companies. It was also reported that the Memorandum of Understanding among the central bank, the government and the Group was still being “clarified.” The government did however get the legislation that it wanted.

Guyana
The guarantees of policies and deposits by the Government of Trinidad related only to third parties and only in respect of the companies with which the memorandum was to be signed. They did not extend to other subsidiaries of CL Financial including the Guyana subsidiaries and those which are indebted to CLICO Guyana. Of particular interest to Guyana therefore is the impact on policies including annuities and deposits with CLICO Guyana, and deposits with Republic Bank (Guyana) Limited (RBGL), a subsidiary of the Trinidadian parent whose majority shareholders are those entities being taken over.

Let us look at the last first. Chairman of the local RBL and Managing Director of RBL Trinidad Mr David Dulal-Whiteway announced that government’s gain of Republic Bank’s shares from CL Financial is only an interim measure to secure financial support from the state and will not involve operational control of the bank. The Guyana Association of Bankers (GAB) gave full support to RBGL in a late-night statement issued on January 30 in which it welcomed the decision of the Trinidad Central Bank to intervene to support CL Financial Limited. It noted that commercial banks locally “held excess liquid assets of $29.6B or 71.6% above the statutorily required level,” and that “depositors can feel very confident and assured that the stability and integrity of the local financial system is guaranteed.”

CLICO Guyana, in which two of the three directors are Trinidadian, issued its own statement through its CEO Ms Geeta Singh-Knight in which she announced that the statutory fund (required by the Insurance Act 1998) of the company which is a separate entity within the CL Financial Group was “in good standing”; none of its assets are intertwined with CLlCO [TRINIDAD] or CLlCO Investment Bank”; and that developments involving its parent CL Financial Limited have no financial impact.

Meeting
On the day the news broke in Trinidad, Minister of Finance, Dr Ashni Singh summoned a meeting with CEO Singh-Knight and Commissioner of Insurance Maria van Beek. He wanted to ascertain the extent of exposure, if any, of CLICO Guyana to the events in Port-of-Spain and requested the company to supply to the Commissioner of Insurance by last Monday further “information on the financial status of the Group, details of the transaction agreed with the authorities in Trinidad and Tobago, and of the implications of these developments for the operations of the Group as a whole and the Guyana company in particular.”

Nothing further has been said publicly by the Minister who appears to have committed a procedural error of judgment since the better thing to do would have been to meet with the two parties consecutively. The public has not been told whether all the information requested has been provided and analysed and the Commissioner of Insurance has been silent.

Like Trinidad, CLICO Guyana takes money on deposit from the public but because of the Bank of Guyana’s interpretation of the law the company does not require a licence from the Bank of Guyana to do so. As a result the responsibility for supervising CLICO’s financial operations falls entirely under the Commissioner of Insurance and the office should have been far more proactive than it has been in this matter. There is a lot at stake, including insurance policies, annuities and pensions, and huge sums invested in the company by the NIS.

Monitoring
President Jagdeo announced that his government was watching the situation closely, and trying to put into context the scale of any potential problem the company may encounter, noting that CLICO (Guyana) makes up just three per cent of the country’s total financial assets. The President who has appointed the company’s CEO to the GuySuCo board added that the only problem he could envisage in the short term was a mismatch between liabilities and assets.

Then late on Friday Deputy Governor of the Bank of Guyana, Dr Gobind Ganga said that the central bank is “very much concerned” at the financial crisis within the CL Financial Group and confirmed that the bank is tracking every bit of information being provided on the issue as it develops – hardly a clear statement in these circumstances.

Such statements may sound good but what is needed is critical analysis of factual information, particularly given the attention span of politicians. The discussions between the government and the company seem to emphasise “investments or dealings with sister companies CIB or CLICO (Trinidad),” which can cause dealings with other related entities to be overlooked.

So far no one seems to be dissecting the 2007 financial statements, or requesting a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding and asking that the relevant transactions for 2008 be made public. It cannot be too hard to determine the liquidity situation of the company or the exposure to related parties – the issues that sparked the crisis in Trinidad. CL’s financial statements for 2008 are not yet out but the regulators in Trinidad have obviously requested and received them.

A limited financial perspective
The audit of the Guyana company’s books for 2008 is in progress and only the 2007 statements audited by Deloitte and Touche are available. I therefore sought some updated information from Ms Singh-Knight who was most forthcoming and extremely helpful.

The 2007 financial statements, which regrettably are not that reader-friendly and could benefit from significant enhancements, state that the company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CL Financial Limited. At December 2007 it owed CLICO Trinidad $1.2 billion (representing 10% of its total assets) and reduced this balance in 2008 to $800 million. This amount is interest free but repayable on demand. Does the Memorandum of Understanding permit the deferral of the debt in the interest of the Guyana company or not?

The net assets of the company at December 31, 2007 amounted to $11.7 billion of which $1.2 billion was classified as current assets but which included accrued investment income of $500 million, largely from related parties. In the bank at that date was $127 million. Its current liabilities or payables are stated at $1.7 billion including the $1.2 billion owed to CLICO Trinidad. The company treats all policy holders’ funds as equity and these include $8.030 billion in Ordinary life policies, including annuities. The holders of these annuities can surrender their policies and expect to receive payment within one week.

The company’s primary investments are in Caribbean Resources Limited (CRL) and CLICO (Bahamas) Limited. At December 31, 2007, investments in these entities totalled $1.5B and $6.0B or 13% and 51% of total assets respectively. Investments in the Berbice Bridge Company Inc (BBCI) total $1.8B, or 16% of total assets bringing total investments in three related entities to 80% of total assets.

20090208_table
Source: CLICO Guyana Annual Report 2007

The last annual return filed by CRL was for 2001 and therefore updated information was not available for our review. The investment in CLICO (Bahamas) Limited, an insurance subsidiary of CL whose 2007 financial statements are available on the internet, represents approximately 30% of that company’s assets.

The Guyana company’s financial statements describe the investments in the Bahamas company as Fixed Deposits, which is misleading since that suggests a banking type deposit. In fact, despite the auditors of the two entities bearing the same international name, the Bahamas company in its corresponding account includes the amount not in Equity but as Annuities under the broad heading Future Policy Benefit Reserves.

It is apposite to note that as the 2007 financial statements indicate, the company is in breach of section 55 of the Insurance Act 1998 which requires that 85% of the statutory fund be held in Guyana. One now has to wonder whether the company has taken steps to remedy this situation.

Bahamas company
The CRL investment is guaranteed by the troubled CL Financial group while the investment in the BBCI would clearly not be liquid. The Bahamas company too has its own problems with the auditor’s report containing an Emphasis of Matter noting that 59% of the company’s assets were invested in a related company, CLICO Enterprises Limited. The audited financial statements did not show an amount due to the Guyana company at December 31, 2007 in its related party notes, but annuities total 70.0M Bahamian dollars, of which Guyana would hold 42%.

On August 21, 2008, AM Best Company Inc, a financial services credit rating organisation, downgraded CLICO (Bahamas) Limited’s financial strength rating to B (Fair) from B+ (Good) and issuer credit rating to “bb” from “bbb-”. The outlook for both ratings is stated as “negative.” The ratings for Colonial Life Insurance Company (Trinidad) Limited were similarly downgraded on February 2, 2009 as news broke of its troubles and both companies were placed “under review.”

Conclusion
I was informed by the company’s CEO that it has met all demands for funds since the news broke. The last thing the company needs is an unusual demand from its policy holders. What is now very important is for the Minister of Finance, the government and the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance to ask the right questions and to get hard information from the company. Now that everyone has been before the cameras and has had their photo opportunities, the hard work must begin.

It is not enough to downplay the impact of any potential difficulties and we should not forget that the NIS up to December 31, 2005 (the last date for which financial statements have been released) was heavily invested (to the tune of $7.7B) in the company. Unfortunately Ms Linda Gossai, a member of the scheme’s investment committee would not disclose to me the extent of its current investment, claiming that she does not “keep those figures in her head.” Instead of simply tracking information on the issue as it develops, the Bank of Guyana needs to start thinking whether, like Trinidad, there are regulatory issues which need to be addressed with respect to what amounts to deposit taking by some insurance companies.

The Bank of Guyana should have long contacted its counterpart on a confidential basis for a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding and to have an informed basis to deal with its concern. Too many people just seem to be waiting and that is not good enough at any time, let alone now. It is also clear that the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance simply does not have the resources, the authority or apparently the will to deal with issues like these. The local authorities should act quickly by first obtaining and analysing the relevant information and having further discussions and agreement with the company, and then following this by a visit to Trinidad and The Bahamas to meet with the relevant persons. Delay only drags the situation out, which is not good for either the company or the economy.