The PNC-R’s 20-Point Plan for Guyana’s Oil and Gas Sector Part 2 And Questions about Sale of Oil
Introduction
Today’s column concludes the review of the PNC-R 20-point plan launched at a press conference hosted by its Leader Aubrey Norton last month. Unfortunately, neither Norton nor any in his circle of leadership has subsequently promoted the plan by interviews, letters or public engagements. True to form, the first critical response came from the Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo who is not without his own problems with the sector. The plan has, however, won the full-throated support of Dr. Vincent Adams, who is a member of the AFC and, more directly, a member of the Committee appointed by the AFC to prepare its own policy paper on the oil sector. Notably, the publication of the AFC’s policy on petroleum is several weeks late, with no explanation offered to the public.
The PNC’s plan has managed to avoid addressing some of the glaring deficiencies and omissions in the content and operationalising of the 2016 Petroleum Agreement, even within a wordy and extensive twenty points. At best, the plan could be considered cautious, conservative and careful, the minor changes here and there doing nothing to assure Guyanese that the PNC-R has the will or the capacity for any meaningful, let alone fundamental change to the 2016 Agreement. The party’s approach may be politically calculated to avoid alienating international oil companies or risking Guyana’s reputation, as does the PPP. Or maybe, like the PPP, it has swallowed the cool aid of “sanctity of contract.” In other words, there is little that separates the PPP/C and the PNC-R on their attitude to the Agreement.
Electoral interest over the national interest
Perhaps the most glaring issue with the PNCR/APNU’s plan is its complete lack of urgency or timelines. The plan is essentially a promissory note contingent on the party winning the next elections in November 2025 – more than a year away. This delay is particularly egregious given that the Norton leadership has several years to observe how the agreement has operated against the national interest.
Instead of urgently addressing the matter and taking a clear position – one way or the other – the PNC-R has chosen a “kick the can down the road” strategy that may have no political benefit other than that it will not have to follow-through, since success in winning the next elections is only a remote possibility. But any responsible, major opposition party is required to be consistently vigilant, representing those who voted or will vote for it. For the majority of Guyanese, this is not an election issue. It is a reality of everyday life, of our patrimony, of our sovereignty, our integrity, the future of our country, and of every Guyanese present and future. Every day that passes under the current agreement represents a missed opportunity to secure better terms for the Guyanese people with the potential of bringing in billions of US dollars.
This approach is particularly disappointing given the high stakes involved. Guyana’s oil resources represent a once-in-a-generation opportunity for national development. Every barrel of oil extracted under the current terms represents revenue lost to the Guyanese people. The PNC-R’s willingness to allow this situation to continue unchallenged for years to come is a serious abdication of responsibility and a betrayal of the trust placed on it by more than two hundred thousand voters.
The plan’s emphasis on building institutional capacity, reference to local content and environmental considerations is commendable but without a clear commitment to renegotiating the terms of existing agreements, there is little value to this plan. It might have been better if the PNC-R had described the document as a statement of intent or a policy framework paper but as a plan, it is really of little use and value.
Conclusion
Perhaps most critically, the plan’s failure to directly address the 40-year stability clause represents a significant missed opportunity. This clause, which effectively freezes the regulatory environment for four decades, is a major constraint on Guyana’s sovereignty and ability to adapt its policies as circumstances change. By not challenging this clause, the PNCR/APNU may be acquiescing to a long-term limitation on Guyana’s control over its own resources and muzzling its parliament,
The plan’s reluctance to commit to renegotiation and its failure to address the stability clause suggest a preference for the status quo over pursuing transformative change. This is not what Guyana needs and not what the people want. It does nothing to persuade any objective person to lend their support.
Where is this $1,500,250,000 ($1.5 Bn)?
The Government of Guyana is inviting tenders for the sale of its share of profit oil under the 2016 Petroleum Agreement. In his 2024 Budget Speech, the Senior Minister responsible for Finance gave particulars of the lifts received by Guyana under the 2016 Petroleum Agreement in 2023 and earlier this week the Minister of Natural Resources disclosed limited payment terms by the selling agents of the seventeen 17 million barrels of oil making up those lifts.
As the table below shows, the Government has received $1,500 Mn. from its selling agents which under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Rules to which Guyana subscribes, requires full disclosure of:
- The volume of the production sold.
- The revenue received from the sale.
- The buyer(s) of the government’s share of production.
Commission earned on Sale of Government oil
Source Budget Speech 2024 and Minister of Natural Resources – Kaieteur News Article
There are several deficiencies. It requires the average reader to make assumptions about the number of lifts sold and to compute the amount of revenue received. There is information on the gross sums received from royalty, but no disaggregation of the royalty received from each of the contractors. Nothing on the identity of the buyers, their country of operations, or the terms of the respective sale.
Regarding the agents, it is highly unusual for agents to pay commission to their principals, but the oil universe is populated by dealers involved in sanction-busting, money laundering, drug trafficking and arms trading, so stranger things do happen.
The table also shows that Guyana sold almost two-thirds of its oil via an agent (BB Energy) who is paying just over one-third the rate of commission payable by the other agent. That defies business logic and certainly needs some investigation. Had all the oil been sold via the agent paying the higher rate (JE Energy), the revenue earned would have US$11.9 million, meaning that we would have earned US$4.5 Mn more than we did, while if the composition of the sale had switched, we would have still earned a more modest but still significant US$2.2 million more. Significantly, the names of the agents suggest that they are unincorporated entities!
But there is an even more immediate, fundamental and direct concern about this revenue, and that is the absence of information on how the money is accounted for. A search of the Natural Resources Fund shows only three sources of income – royalties, the revenue from profit oil and interest earned. Similarly, the Revenue Estimates presented to the National Assembly do not disclose any information on this significant source of revenue.
This non-disclosure is concerning, in violation of the country’s obligation under its EITI membership, the rules of accountability and transparency, and a government’s duty to disclose. This will almost never happen if we had an empowered, independent Petroleum Commission but will almost always happen once we retain the existing inept supervisory arrangement over the oil companies currently in place.
Next week will deal with this month’s scheduled relinquishment.